The Government of British Columbia refused to fund this road for more than a decade, refused it
the designation that would have protected it, and now says it is too dangerous to keep.
The excavators are re-tendered — bids close 24 September 2026. The public was never asked.
So we decided to put the entire storyline on the record in public view.
The Government of British Columbia has given
five different reasons for destroying this road.
Its own documents contradict every one of them.
The excavators are re-tendered, with bids closing 24 September 2026 — to proceed without public consultation. We are asking for a pause, because this government did not follow its own process and decided behind closed doors.
Every record we FOI will be published on this page — the emails, the briefing notes, the government’s own numbers. Let’s get into it ↓
Rady Creek is a single-lane road that leaves Highway 31 east of Trout Lake and climbs. In under an hour it lifts you from the valley floor to fifteen hundred metres of alpine on Silvercup Ridge. It is beautiful alpine.
Miners cut the first grade here more than a century ago to reach the Silver Cup mine, which pulled roughly a million and a half ounces of silver out of this mountain between 1895 and 1915. The ore ran out and the town emptied — a thousand people in 1897, seven by 1959. The road stayed, and people kept using it.
Today it carries dirt bikes, ATVs, mountain bikers, hikers and horseback riders through the summer. In winter it is the primary safe route into the riding area locals call Foggy Day. It reaches some of the oldest active mineral claims in the province. And it serves what is left of Trout Lake — a community whose three remaining industries are tourism, mineral exploration and recreation. All three go up this road.
It is also the middle of only three ways onto Silvercup Ridge. An old miner-built pack trail runs the length of that ridge. Take out the centre access and anyone in trouble up there has to reach one of the far ends, or wait for a helicopter.
This is not a logging spur. The route onto the ridge was surveyed and built as public works, and the Province recorded it at the time — in a report it wrote, printed and published itself.

The 1914 survey describes the trunk trail from Trout Lake to Six-mile creek, “thence by a series of long switchbacks on an easy grade past the Winslow mine on to the summit of the Silver Cup ridge” — the same switchbacks now scheduled for full re-contour. The 1934 report returns to the ridge and records the Foggy Day group at the head of the South fork of Brown creek, and prospecting carried on by Mrs. Jowett — Alice Jowett, whose memorial still stands up this road.
Trout Lake held over a thousand people when the Silver Cup was producing. By 1959 there were seven. The people who stayed are the ones who have kept this road open.
The Trout Lake Recreational Club told the Ministry in November 2025 that it was in its tenth year, with “over 300 members at times” — the club’s own count, which no independent record confirms. ↗ It is not a lobby group and it employs no one. It is the body that holds the Wildlife Act permit for the Central Selkirk Snowmobile Management Area, which is how anyone rides here legally — members buy into the club, and the club carries the permit, the insurance and the obligations that come with it.
It also carries the work. In its Section 57 application the club set out what maintaining this corridor actually costs, in volunteer hours rather than dollars: inspection and drainage checks each spring and fall, hand-digging and clearing cross drains, brushing and debris removal, signage and hazard repair. Between thirty and forty hours a year on brushing alone. That was the offer the Province refused.
And the club has quietly covered things well beyond the road. The internet at the Trout Lake hall — the only connection in a valley with no cell service — was put in so that visitors could buy a club membership on arrival in town. The Ministry paid for it for the first couple of years; in 2021 the club took over the bill, and has carried it since.Trout Lake Recreational Club, 4 September 2026 — the club’s own account. We hold no document on the hall connection.
They are joined by the Arrow Lakes ATV Club and the Four Wheel Drive Association of British Columbia, both of which have completed Section 57 authorisations of their own elsewhere, and by the BC Snowmobile Federation. This is who the road belongs to: a handful of people in a valley of seven-hundred-odd — just over fifty of them full-time residents of the village of Trout Lake at the foot of the road — doing unpaid work on public infrastructure the Province stopped maintaining more than a decade ago.










The Rady Creek road and the country it reaches. Photographs by the Trout Lake Recreational Club, used with permission.
For years the club built and recorded this trail network alongside the agency that manages recreation on Crown land. In 2017 it took its maps to that agency and asked to have the routes made official.
The Trout Lake Recreational Club maintains its own trail network and its own mapping of it. In 2017 the club went to Recreation Sites and Trails BC to have the areas it uses made official. On the club’s account a mapping team came out to Trout Lake, the two mapped the ground together, and the club gave the agency a full list of every route it rode and maintained. Nothing released to us shows the agency asking for that list. Trout Lake Recreational Club, in the film at 5:16–5:34. ↗
By the club’s account, that exchange came with something in return: permission to operate its network, and signage for it. The club says it asked for those signs and that they were the province’s first of a new design — “We were the very first club to ever get these. I drove to Nelson and got them for our club.” The recreation officer, asked about it in 2026, confirms the approval, though not the claim to be first: “I did approve the installation of trail names and directional signage for public safety reasons.” The club understood the mapping as the first step toward the thing the funding policy actually requires — formal trail designation, the one classification that would have made this road eligible for maintenance money. Trout Lake Recreational Club, in the film at 5:43 and 5:56. ↗ · RSTBC, 19 August 2026. ↗
The designation never came — and eventually the road the club had just mapped was scheduled for deactivation. No referral to the agency holding those maps, and no reply from it, appears in anything released to us — though a stakeholder submission shown in the documentary quotes the Ministry as saying referrals were sent to it and that no comments came back. We hold the film, not that letter; what it does and does not establish is set out in the questions.
The 2017 trail list, the mapping records and the referral letter are the subject of two of the fifteen requests published here. None has been released. This account is the club’s, and we publish it as theirs until the records are produced.
The riding area on that map is not reachable any other way once the snow comes.






Photographs published by SledderMag, June 2021.
In November 2020 the Auditor General of British Columbia audited how the Province manages its forest service roads. The conclusion was that the Ministry was not maintaining them to its own policies — and the audit explains exactly why.
Every year the natural resource districts — the people on the ground who inspect these roads and know what they need — submit maintenance budget requests. Every year the Engineering Branch funds a sliver of them.
The scale is worth holding in mind. British Columbia has roughly 58,000 kilometres of forest service road. About 30,000 of those are maintained by industry under road use permits, and another 20,000 sit inside BC Timber Sales, which the audit describes as a self-financing programme. What is left is what the districts have to ask for — and only about 12,000 kilometres of it carries the classification the Ministry calls a capital road.
Then narrow it to this region. The South Area, which contains the Selkirk district and Trout Lake, asked for $4.5 million for its priority roads in 2019/20 and received $1.7 million. The single largest slice of what it asked for was recreation access.
The record-keeping was worse than the money. Of eight districts the auditors sampled, seven kept no historical inspection data. Two kept no maintenance records at all. An internal ministry audit had found the same failures in 2008 — twelve years earlier. Nothing had changed in between.
The Ministry was invited to respond inside the report. It did.

Communities and rural residences are tiers one and two. Recreation is tier three — the only tier Rady could ever have qualified under.
In the same response the Ministry accepts that “FSRs are now more broadly used by the public” and that it has had to re-examine its mandate to take in “wilderness access for commercial and recreational purposes.” Told it was not maintaining these roads, it moved recreation further down the list.
The Ministry's funding policy ranks maintenance money in three tiers. First, roads serving communities of fifty or more year-round residents. Second, roads serving rural residences. Third — and this is the one that matters — high-value recreation sites, as designated by the Recreation Sites and Trails BC representative.
Roads that clear any tier become what the Ministry calls capital roads. The Auditor General describes capital roads as unlikely to be deactivated, and as requiring continual maintenance. That protection covers the twelve thousand kilometres of capital road counted above.
The village of Trout Lake — the community this road serves, not the wider valley — has just over fifty full-time residents on the club’s own count, and about a hundred counting the surrounding communities. Nobody lives on Rady Creek, so tier two never applied. Fifty is also the tier-one threshold — so on the club’s figure Trout Lake sits on the line, not below it. Tier three, high-value recreation, is the tier the club pursued — and it swings on a single administrative decision by a single agency.Population — Trout Lake Recreational Club, 4 September 2026. Trout Lake is unincorporated and has no census population of its own.
This is not the usual argument about budgets being tight. The people asking for this money were the Ministry’s own staff — the district engineers who walk these roads and write down what they need. Nobody outside government was making the case. The districts said what the roads required, and head office refused them.
Three things follow, all established on the Auditor General’s evidence:
They did not spend the money. Districts asked for $40.2 million in 2019/20 and were given $5.5 million — 14 cents on the dollar, after three years in which the ask rose 41% and the allocation never moved.
They kept no record of maintaining these roads. Seven of the eight districts audited held no historical inspection data. Two held no maintenance records at all. The same failure was found by the Ministry’s own internal audit in 2008, and was still there twelve years later.
So they cannot say what condition any of it was in. That is what the finding above rests on.
The funding policy does not stop there. It tells districts that roads they cannot afford to maintain should be deactivated — so the shortfall does not merely allow removal, it directs it.Engineering Program Funding Policy, quoted at pp.23 and 47

On 20 April 2026 the Trout Lake Recreational Club applied under Section 57 to take on the upkeep of this road. It costed the work in volunteer hours, not dollars: 5–10 hours of inspection and drainage checks each spring and fall, 20–30 hand-digging cross drains, 30–40 brushing and debris removal, and signage as identified. Recreation Sites and Trails BC refused it on 19 August 2026. That is an offer of work, not a log of work done — the club has never held the road permit, and the Province has never funded anyone to maintain this road. What the club does hold is the record below: the obligations it took on through the same years the funding was being refused, and what it gave up when it was asked. When the Ministry wrote to the parties it treated as stakeholders here — five in April 2021, six in May — the club was not one of them.Section 57 application, Trout Lake Recreational Club, 20 April 2026 · decision of Recreation Sites and Trails BC, 19 August 2026.


The parties are FLNRORD, Kootenay Region, the Arrow Lakes Ridge Riders Snowmobile Club and the Trout Lake Recreational Club — nobody else. This is the agreement under which the clubs gave up riding area in caribou habitat. The clubs signed it in February 2021 — Trout Lake on the 4th, Arrow Lakes on the 15th. The Ministry signed on 24 March 2021, more than a month after them. The club’s copy carries a “Working Draft” watermark; it is the signed copy they hold.
The Province did not spend the money, did not record the maintenance, and gave up nothing. The club gave up riding area, carried the permit and the insurance, and offered to do the upkeep for free. That offer was refused three weeks before the road was put out to tender for destruction.
Three months after signing that agreement, the club learned the road was to be closed — and not from the Ministry. The Province later said the road’s status was “unknown at the time the SMA was negotiated.”
The club offered to do that work in volunteer hours, for nothing, and was refused on 19 August 2026. Three weeks later, on 9 September 2026, the Ministry put the destruction of the same road out to bid as contract EN27DSE008, closing 24 September. What follows is that tender — what the Province would not buy, against what it is paying to buy instead.
The bid package for contract EN27DSE008 was re-issued on 9 September 2026. The tender and the specimen contract attached to it each carry the same finding, in almost the same words. In the tender it opens the description of the work. In the contract it is the first bullet under Safety.


Every price cell is blank, and so is the Total Estimated Bid Price. This is the blank offer form issued with the tender — not a priced bid and not an awarded contract — so every dollar figure below is built from published rates against the Province’s own quantities. Seven priced rows; the table below takes them one at a time.
The ten-hour day is the specimen contract’s: “Where the Unit of Measure is a day, 10 hours is the equivalent of one day.” Read at that day, the excavator’s 160 hours is sixteen days on the ground, with a further 40 hours billed to move it in and out. The quad, the pickup, the labourer and the accommodation are eighteen days each.
The Province would not fund maintenance on this road and now says it is too dangerous to keep. To close it, it has scoped eighteen days of quad travel on it, and requires the driver to hold five years of ATV, side-by-side or UTV experience on rough, eroded, steep roads or trails and competence on 25% to 35% grades — for works whose prescription header reads “Access Level Remaining after Deact: NO ACCESS”.
One term on the form is defined elsewhere in the same package. “Access Improvement” is “Approximately 5.3km’s of minor road access improvement from Hwy 31 to the bottom of the deactivation site”. The Province will improve 5.3 km of access in order to remove 4.4 km of it.Offer Form — Quoted Price Schedule, contract EN27DSE008, Offer Form pages 5 and 6 of 9, at pages 22–23 of the Tender package issued 9 September 2026 via BC Bid opportunity 233877. The access-improvement definition is in the scope of work in the same package. Quantities are the Province’s.
Estimate · built from published BC rates · the Offer Form itself is unpriced
Two single payments — not a budget line. The Province’s own deactivation prescription scoped all 4,395 m of this road and, in ninety-three rows, called it unstable in one place — 42 m, stations 1+150 to 1+192. That is 0.96% of the road. Destroying the road costs 6.7× the fix at the midpoints of our estimates — 4.1× on the reading most generous to the Province, 13.3× on the least. Fix instead of destroy and $70,100–$111,900 is never spent. Both figures are priced on the Province’s own published rates, against the schedule it is taking bids on now.
At the end of the top lane the road is gone and the money is gone. At the end of this one the road is still standing, most of the money has not been spent, and the choice to close it later is still available.
| B · The fix instead | Quantity × rate | Estimate |
|---|---|---|
| Excavator, 6 m reach, operated | 30–60 h × $170–$210/hr | $5,100–$12,600 |
| Excavator fuel (invoiced separately) | 30–60 h × $40–$65/hr | $1,200–$3,900 |
| 4x4 pickup, operated | 3–6 d × $920–$1,070/day | $2,800–$6,400 |
| Stabilise 1+150 to 1+192 — estimate | $9,100–$22,900 |
This contract was tendered once before. The Ministry issued the same contract number on 10 June 2026 with five priced rows and replaced it on 9 September 2026 with seven. Not one of the five quantities survived: the excavator falls from 200 hours to 160, the labourer from 200 to 180, the ATV and the pickup from 20 days to 18 each, and mobilisation and demobilisation rises from 14 hours to 40 — nearly triple, for a job that got shorter. Fuel changed hands with it. The June form kept excavator fuel off the bid rate, to be invoiced separately against the Province’s Off-Road Equipment Fuel Price Adjustment; the re-issue reads “Fuel costs shall be incorporated into the hourly or daily rates by the bidder… Fuel costs shall not be invoiced separately”, moving fuel-price risk onto the contractor. The table above reads the September schedule, because that is the one bids close on.Tender Price Schedule, contract EN27DSE008, Tender package pages 22–23, issued 9 September 2026 via BC Bid opportunity 233877. The June 2026 Offer Form, pages 1 and 2 of 4, is held on file.
| A · Offer Form line — deactivation, tendered 9 September 2026 | Quantity × rate | Estimate |
|---|---|---|
| 1 · Excavator, 6 m reach, operated | 160 h × $170–$210/hr | $27,200–$33,600 |
| 1 · Excavator fuel — now inside the bid rate | 160 h × $40–$65/hr | $6,400–$10,400 |
| 2 · Labourer | 180 h × $40–$85/hr | $7,200–$15,300 |
| 3 · 4x4 ATV, side-by-side or UTV | 18 d × $135–$185/day | $2,400–$3,300 |
| 4 · 4x4 pickup, operated | 18 d × $920–$1,070/day | $16,600–$19,300 |
| 5 · Mobilization / demob | 40 h × $265–$285/hr | $10,600–$11,400 |
| 6 · Certified Faller — the pickup and quad the tender says his rate must include | 8 d × $1,055–$1,255/day | $8,400–$10,000 |
| 6 · Certified Faller — the person, at the Ministry’s own appraisal rate | 8 d × 10 h × $99.12/hr | $7,900 |
| 7 · Private Accommodations — crew of 2–3 | 18 d × 2–3 × $175/person/day | $6,300–$9,500 |
| Destroy all 4,395 m — estimate | $93,000–$121,000 |
Where the faller and the camp rates come from. Item 6 is eight days of a Certified Faller who also holds a Dangerous Tree Assessor certificate, and the tender says what must sit inside that day rate — it “must also include a 4x4 pickup truck and one of either a 4x4 All-Terrain vehicle, a 4x4 Side by Side or one 4x4 Utility Task Vehicle.” Both machines are priced off the same published schedule as every other row: $920–$1,070 a day for the pickup, $135–$185 for the quad. Eight days of them is $8,400–$10,000 before the faller is paid anything. The 2026 BC Wildfire equipment schedule prices neither the faller nor accommodation — its §1 “Falling” prices feller-bunchers, which are machines — but the Ministry’s own Interior Appraisal Manual prices both, and states they “must be used for all engineering cost estimates”: a “Faller, including powersaw cost” at $99.12 an hour, and $175 a day per person for crew accommodation. Eight days at the contract’s ten-hour day is $7,900; eighteen days of camp for two to three people is $6,300–$9,500. Not in the total: the Dangerous Tree Assessor ticket, for which no published premium exists; the contractor’s overhead and margin; and the fuel-price risk the re-issue moved onto the bidder. All three push the real bid up, not down.Item 6 quoted verbatim from Tender package page 22; the ten-hour day from clause 1.02 of the Specimen Contract for the same tender. Faller and crew-accommodation rates — Ministry of Forests, Timber Pricing Branch — Interior Appraisal Manual, effective 1 July 2026, Appendix I, pages A-7 and A-8. Quantities and rates are the Province’s; the accommodation crew size and the totals are ours.
This is not a one-time cost set against a yearly programme. Both numbers are single payments. One of them repairs the 42 metres the Province’s own prescription found unstable. The other removes all 4,395 — including the 4,353 metres it did not. Fixing the 42 costs $9,100–$22,900; removing the 4,395 costs $93,000–$121,000.
Nobody is asking the Province to fund this road every year, and it has not been funding it. It stopped, the Auditor General recorded why, and the road has stood through five seasons since the Ministry first proposed to close it in August 2021.Consultation Request Intake Form, 27 April 2021.
So the question is not whether the Province can afford this road. It is whether $93,000–$121,000 should be spent removing 4,395 metres permanently because 42 of them are unstable, when $9,100–$22,900 fixes the 42 and leaves $70,100–$111,900 for the maintenance the districts asked for and did not get.
All of this is an estimate. Every price cell on the Offer Form is blank, so both totals are ours. The arithmetic is in the two tables above — quantity, rate and result on every line — and every rate is linked below.
Footnote — what if the Province did fund upkeep? It does not, and for five seasons it has not. If it did pay contract rates for one season of work on the whole road, our estimate on the same rates is $12,800–$34,000: 2–4 machine-days grading and shaping ($6,000–$15,300), and 2–4 days of machine plus labourer brushing and clearing the cross drains ($6,800–$18,700). Adding that second person takes those rows to $342–$467 an hour, against $210–$275 for the bare machine. Those day counts are ours — the only quantities in this whole block taken from no document at all, which is why they sit in a footnote and not in the comparison above: price maintenance as an annual line and an analyst capitalises it, when the record is that nobody has been billing for it. What the Trout Lake Recreational Club actually offered under Section 57 in April 2026 was 5–10 hours of inspection and drainage checks each spring and fall, 20–30 hand-digging cross drains, 30–40 brushing and debris removal, and signage as identified — in volunteer hours, for nothing. Recreation Sites and Trails BC refused it on 19 August 2026.
The quantities on the Offer Form are the Province’s; the rates and both totals are ours, and every rate below is published, dated and linked. The ATV line, reconciled. §11.1 of the wildfire schedule gives a four-wheel ATV an all-found day rate of $79.71 and then adds a market fuel adjustment for the month — +$55.83 in July, +$61.44 in June — which is $135.54 a day. A four-wheel side-by-side, the unit that can carry the labourer and the tools this contract requires, is $114.20 plus $68.05–$74.89, or $182–$189. Our $135–$185 is that span, end to end. (§11.1 carries its own note that its rates are for use with the Forest Sector Guidelines to Compensation; it is the only ATV line the schedule publishes.) It is priced as equipment only: the schedule’s own operator rate is $83.17 an hour, so a day with a person on the machine adds about $830. A machine-day is one excavator on site for the ten-hour day the tender’s own notes set, with its fuel, plus the 4x4 pickup that gets the crew there: $3,020–$3,820. Priced that way the fix costs $303–$382 for every hour the machine is on the ground, against $210–$275 for machine-plus-fuel in table A — 39–44% above our own machine rate. The labourer is a contract rate, not a wage: Job Bank gives the Kootenay wage for the occupation as $18.27–$39.85 an hour and we carry it at $40–$85 to cover employer costs, supervision and overhead — roughly 2.1×. That multiple is ours and is in neither document. The BC Wildfire schedule sets fire rates, priced for emergency mobilisation; a scheduled summer contract is a different risk, and we cannot say which way that bias runs. It is still the right comparator, because it is built the way the tender is: “All Found Rate means equipment and operator together with all costs and expenses… excluding fuel and lubricants,” with fuel added by a separate monthly adjustment — exactly how the June 2026 Offer Form handled the excavator. That parallel broke on 9 September 2026. The re-issued tender folds fuel into the bid rate — “Fuel costs shall be incorporated into the hourly or daily rates by the bidder in the columns above for all equipment. Fuel costs shall not be invoiced separately” — so the fuel line in table A is no longer a separate invoice item against the Province’s Fuel Price Adjustment but a cost the contractor now carries inside the hourly rate. The machine class is ours. The June 2026 Offer Form specified the excavator by mass — “45,000lbs-67,999lbs (20.41 tonnes to 30.84 tonnes)” — and we chose §7.1 to match it. The 9 September 2026 re-issue states no mass at all. It specifies the machine by capability instead: “One tracked excavator that is capable of completing the works listed in the prescription… The excavator must be capable of reaching and pulling back fill material over 6 meters.” The tonnage that used to label these two tables had no source left, so we have taken it out rather than carry a number no document supports. What stands in its place is the Ministry’s own 6-metre reach requirement, and a rate class we picked ourselves and are naming as ours. Rates — BC Wildfire Service, Ministry of Forests — 2026 BCWS Equipment Rates and Market Fuel Adjustments, 2 August 2026 (§7.1 excavator (guarded), §6.3 lowbeds, §6.4 pickups, §11.1 all-terrain vehicles); Job Bank, Government of Canada — NOC 75110, Kootenay region, wages updated 19 November 2025 (low $18.27 / median $26.95 / high $39.85 per hour). Quantities — Offer Form, Quoted Price Schedule, contract EN27DSE008, pages 1–2. Road figures recomputed by us from the deactivation prescription: 74 cross ditches, 362 m of pull-back (42+140+40+20+30+90), instability at one 42 m location, 1+150 to 1+192.

It is the fourth paragraph of the passage that tells bidders what the job is, between the November completion date and the list of works. Contentious is the Ministry’s own word for it, written for contractors rather than for the public. It records that the Ministry expects opposition and has planned around it.EN27DSE008 Tender package, page 3 of the Information to Bidders — the passage is quoted whole in the image above

The same finding in the document the successful bidder signs — and here it is the first bullet under the heading Safety. The bullet beneath it is about the road: gradients “between 23% and 35%” with “severe levels of erosion and uneven road surfaces.” Public opposition is the first item under that heading; the condition of the road is the second.EN27DSE008 Specimen Contract, page 5, Schedule A – Services, clause 1.04.

The hazard list the Ministry gives bidders, complete and in the Ministry’s own order: dangerous trees, the public, potential soil mass movement, and road grades of +25% to +35%. Four items. The second is people.
Working a machine on a steep, eroded road beside people who object to the work is a real safety problem, and a contract that plans for it is a contract doing its job. It is also the Province recording public opposition to its own decision as a field hazard, in a list with unstable ground and dangerous trees, and undertaking to keep security on site twenty-four hours a day for the length of the job.EN27DSE008 Tender package, pages 3 and 4; EN27DSE008 Specimen Contract, page 5, clause 1.04 — the three images above
The same sentence names who pays for it. The words are “The Ministry of Forests will provide” — not the contractor. The tender’s price schedule carries no security row, and the two security requirements the tender does name are both switched off.

Across the twenty-seven-page tender package there are twenty-two mentions of security. Twenty-one of them are money — bid bonds, performance bonds, and the definitions and default clauses that hang off them — and the two that would have applied to this contract are struck out on this page. One is guarding, and it is the sentence above. In the twenty-two-page specimen contract the word appears once in the whole document, and it is that same sentence again.
So the only security this contract involves is people on the ground, the words are “The Ministry of Forests will provide”, and there is no row anywhere in the price schedule for a bidder to quote it on. Round-the-clock security for the length of the works is a cost the Province carries, and it sits in nobody’s bid.
The package states no figure, and a bidder never sees one. What can be said is where it sits: the costing above prices the works, and it does not include this — because the tender does not price it either.EN27DSE008 Tender package, page 10 of the Conditions of Tender, and its Tender Price Schedule at page 22, read in full. Counts run across the whole 27-page tender package and the whole 22-page specimen contract.
Neither of the first two funding tiers was ever open to this road. The only door left was the third — high-value recreation — and it opened on the say-so of a single agency. The funding policy, the three tiers and what each one requires are set out in 02 — The money.
That agency is Recreation Sites and Trails BC. In 2017 the Trout Lake Recreational Club went to it and asked for exactly the thing the funding policy requires — official recognition of the terrain it rode. A member says it plainly on camera: “We gave Rec Sites and Trails our list of our recreational trails.” The agency’s own recreation officer, writing in August 2026, recalls the conversation and confirms what came of it — signage, but no authorization. Trout Lake Recreational Club, in the film at 8:00. ↗ · RSTBC, 19 August 2026. ↗
What happened over the nine years that followed is the heart of this story.
Held by the Trout Lake Recreational Club and provided to us in full. Written three months after the Ministry countersigned the stewardship agreement, and copied to the Minister.

Written at executive-director level, copied to Minister Katrine Conroy. Three things sit in it. The Province states that “the status of the Rady Forest Service Road was unknown at the time the SMA was negotiated” — the clubs signed a caribou stewardship agreement four months earlier without being told. It gives the original rationale: the licensee is giving up the road permit, so “the FSR must be deactivated at this time to prevent future environmental liability.” And it makes two commitments — that the district “tries to maintain some type of vehicle access after deactivation” and that staff will work with the prescribing engineer “to maintain the highest possible level of access for future recreational use.”
The 2017 trail list, the mapping records and the referral letter are all covered by requests published here.
A logging company’s road permit had already become the reason there was suddenly no time — two months before that letter was written. It is named in the Ministry’s own consultation paperwork — and that document does more to undo the Ministry’s case than anything the club could have written.
Cooper Creek Cedar — “CCC” in the Ministry’s paperwork — is the forest licensee. It holds two road permit sections, R07745.04 (3.78 km) and R07745.05 (1.657 km), which together form the lower road you drive to reach the start of the Rady FSR. The Ministry says the company was giving those up, and says it had already postponed the work from 2020 to 2021 so the referrals could be run. The company did plan this, and said so in writing in January 2020. The deactivation has still not happened.
On 14 January 2020, Cooper Creek Cedar ran its own referral. Mike Kit, RPF, the company’s harvesting supervisor, circulated a referral document, maps and a mapping file for “Cooper Creek Cedar’s planned road deactivation works in the Trout Lake Forest Development Unit.” Writing on 2 March 2020, he set out why: the company “no longer has operable tenure within the areas that these roads access due to harvesting restrictions imposed to preserve Caribou Habitat,” and its objective was “to deactivate road sections to a standard that will relieve Cooper Creek Cedar of the liability associated with the Road Permit.”
He also said the company would try to keep the road open to quads. “Cooper Creek Cedar will attempt to maintain at minimum ATV access.” And he offered a way out that nobody took up: “Cooper Creek Cedar would be willing to transfer any road sections under our Road Permit to stakeholder groups that would like to assume liability.” Fourteen months later the Ministry decided there would be no ATV access at all — going further than the licensee had ever proposed. We are approaching Cooper Creek Cedar directly, and we will publish what they tell us — whatever it is.
From that, the Ministry drew its conclusion: once those sections go, “access will be cut off for industrial equipment to get up to the start of the FSR,” and so FLNRORD is “forced to deactivate the FSR prior to CCC deactivating their Road Permit sections.” That is the origin of the deadline — and the First Nations referral went out under it.
Read the whole passage, though, and the argument does not survive its own paragraph.
And four and a half years after the Ministry made that claim, it was still describing that road as live. Its own referral of 17 November 2025 tells a neighbouring licensee it is sending the notice because “the road comes off of a Cooper Creek RP road” — present tense. Whatever was going to cut off access in 2021 had not done so by the end of 2025, and the Ministry now plans to drive excavators up that same road before the snow closes it in 2026.

The sentence quoted above, in the document it came from. Mike Kit, RPF, opened the referral on 14 January 2020 with three recipients — a heli-ski operator, a guest ranch and one individual, not one of them government — and Kim Smith answered for ATVBC on 27 February, attaching the association’s letter of response. The thread did not end at those three. By Mike Kit’s reply of 2 March it was carrying two Ministry officials as well — the exhibit directly below. That attached letter is the one document in this exchange we still do not hold.

The header of the reply, in full. The January referral above went to three recipients and not one of them was government; by 2 March the Cc line holds two Ministry officials — John Hawkings, and Tennessee Trent of Recreation Sites and Trails BC, the one agency that could have designated these routes — alongside two further ATVBC addresses. The reply itself is reproduced whole further down this section.

The sentence quoted above, in the document it came from. The same referral states the Ministry’s reason in its own words, and it is not safety — it is that the road no longer qualifies for maintenance money. It also states the outcome flatly: “There will be no motor vehicle access remaining after the deactivation works have been completed.” The consultation form of 27 April 2021, two exhibits above, had promised the opposite. What the funding policy is, and how a road stops meeting it, is section 02.
The company planned this work for the 2020 field season and did not carry it out. The Province’s own tenure record still lists both sections as active, with no retirement date. The deadline the Ministry built its case on has not arrived in the five years since.
| Section | Name | Length | Life-cycle status | Retirement date |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| R07745.04 | Branch 4 | 3.7835 km | ACTIVE | none |
| R07745.05 | Branch 5 | 1.6576 km | ACTIVE | none |
| R07745.03 | Branch 3 | 0.7372 km | RETIRED | 17 June 2011 |
Sections 04 and 05 are the two the Ministry named — together 5.441 km, the road from Highway 31 to the foot of the Rady FSR. Section 03 on the same permit was retired in 2011, so this shows that there is indeed a field that the Ministry fills in when a road is actually retired.
The permit was awarded in 1995 and carries no expiry date. Under section 79 of the Forest Planning and Practices Regulation a road permit runs until the road is deactivated or the permit passes to someone else — it does not lapse on a calendar date. And the licensee is not leaving: Forest Licence A30171 runs to December 2029.
The access below the FSR was never going to disappear on its own. Somebody would have to decide to end it. Five years after the Ministry told First Nations it was “forced to deactivate the FSR,” nobody has.
The unedited response, its HTTP headers, its checksum and an independent Internet Archive capture are filed in the archive. ↗
The deactivation the Ministry built its deadline on has still not happened. The conclusion drawn from it is still standing.
Set plainly, the Ministry’s position is that it had to destroy the road now because later it would not be able to drive a machine up to destroy it. The only thing the deadline protected was the ability to carry out the very work it was used to justify — and the referral was answered on that footing.
The road was never the problem. Two parties followed the process properly — the club sought a designation, and the licensee ran its own referral and offered to hand the road over. The Ministry did neither. It reversed its own written commitment in fourteen days, applied to this road none of the notification it was building in July 2022 for four others — Blazed, Jersey, Duhamel Heights and Akokli — and has given five different reasons since. The complete chronology — thirty-five dated entries, each carrying the document behind it — is in section 15.
2017 — the club asks for the one protection available. The Trout Lake Recreational Club maps the routes it rides and maintains and submits the list to Recreation Sites and Trails BC, the one agency that could formally designate them. On 20 March 2017 the club’s secretary-treasurer tells members she has “sent in a list of trails to Travis Mitchell with Recs Sites and Trails” and has telephoned him to arrange a meeting. Eleven days later the district’s recreation officer, Justin Dexter, writes back: “Travis has been keeping me in the loop regarding your interest in snowmobile riding areas in the vicinity of Trout Lake.”Trout Lake Recreational Club to members, 20 March 2017 ↗ · Justin Dexter, Recreation Officer, RSTBC, to the club, 31 March 2017 ↗
31 March 2017 — the agency sends the application form and recommends a different route. In the same reply the recreation officer attaches the Section 57 application form and its guidelines, and sets out four things to weigh before applying. Legally, he writes, “the public can snowmobile on existing resource roads and the area accessed by these roads unless there is a closure in place”; formal establishment “could be considered”, but would mean “a lot of work” — work he would be asking the club itself to do, in helping mitigate the concerns raised from the referral process. His recommendation is a couple of small staging areas instead — “a very effective way of securing use without ruffling feathers and causing a referral nightmare.”Recreation Officer, Kootenay Boundary District, RSTBC, to the club, 31 March 2017 ↗
2017–2026 — the signage goes up, the designation never does. No Section 57 application was made in 2017. Over the two years that follow, that agency installs the Province’s own signage and treats the routes as public, without ever granting the designation that would have protected them. The club applied nine years later, on 20 April 2026, and on 19 August 2026 the agency declined it.The signage, and the account of the 2017 conversation, as the recreation officer gave it nine years later: District Recreation Officer, RSTBC, 19 August 2026 ↗
14 January 2020 — a proposal, not a decision. Mike Kit, RPF, Cooper Creek Cedar’s harvesting supervisor, circulates a referral on proposed deactivation works. It is put out for comment, and nothing in the company’s position removes access — it says it will try to keep the road open to quads. No access is a Ministry position, arrived at sixteen months later.Referral, Trout Lake Forest Development Unit, 14 January 2020 ↗
2 March 2020 — the company offers to hand the road over, and the recreation agency is copied. Cooper Creek Cedar puts two things on the table: “Cooper Creek Cedar will attempt to maintain at minimum ATV access”, and it is “willing to transfer any road sections under our Road Permit to stakeholder groups that would like to assume liability.” Nobody takes either up. On the Cc line is Tennessee Trent, Regional Director of Recreation Sites and Trails BC — the one body that could have designated these routes, holding the company’s own account of the plan fourteen months before the Ministry settled on no access.Reply to ATVBC, 2 March 2020, Cc John Hawkings and Tennessee Trent ↗
27 April 2021 — the referral promises access. The document First Nations and stakeholders were consulted on describes works that keep the road open to quads: “Every attempt will be made to maintain ATV access over the FSR and up onto the Silvercup Ridge once the deactivation works are complete.”Consultation Request Intake Form, 27 April 2021 ↗
11 May 2021 — fourteen days later, amended to no access. To exactly the people just promised it. The header cell of the prescription is the whole story: the original of 7 October 2020 reads “Access Level Remaining after Deact: ATV”; the revision reads “NO ACCESS”. Every row that had been drawn to leave a quad trail — the five-step graduated pullback, the three water bars, the “Construct ATV’able barricade” — was deleted.“It has been decided that there will be NO ATV ACCESS LEFT OPEN AFTER THE RADY FSR IS PERMANENTLY DEACTIVATED.” ↗

Written by the club’s secretary-treasurer nine years before the Section 57 application. It records the trail list going to Travis Mitchell at Recreation Sites and Trails BC and her telephone call to him; the meeting with his supervisor is what Mitchell proposed in return. The body is written to the membership — it opens “Hi everyone” — but the copy we hold went from the club’s role account to one named recipient at a private address, which is what the header above shows.

Eleven days after the club’s list went in. The reply attaches the Section 57 application and its guidelines and lists four things to weigh: formal establishment could be considered, “but I would be asking your group to do a lot of work in helping mitigate concerns raised from the referral process”. His recommendation is a couple of small staging areas instead — “a very effective way of securing use without ruffling feathers and causing a referral nightmare.” The header names both attachments. The email closes: “At this time I don’t see the need for a face to face meeting however if you choose to move this process forward (via formal application) I think a meeting would be a good idea.”

The Ministry did not follow its own process. It ran a First Nations referral on a description of the works, then changed that description fourteen days later and never re-ran it. It built a public notification process — field signs a year ahead, a written comment deadline, a fact sheet at the front desk — and applied it in July 2022 to four other roads — Blazed, Jersey, Duhamel Heights and Akokli — while giving this one none of it. Its own briefing note identifies the section the club should have applied under, and commits to offering the club a way out; the club heard neither for four years. And the two records that would show how the decision was actually made are unavailable: the alternatives the prescriber set out are redacted under FIPPA s.16, and no referral to the recreation agency, or reply from it, appears anywhere in what has been released.
The reason the Ministry gives today is public safety, and it has told the public that removal was “prescribed by a professional engineer.” The prescription itself names a Registered Forest Technologist.
It is not a new opinion either. The same document is referenced in the 2021 letter, where the work is described as preventing “future environmental problems.” By 2026 it had become a matter of public safety. The engineering did not change. The framing did.
For five years no terrain stability assessment, no geotechnical report and no hydrology report was published, and the petitioners say none was ever disclosed to them. That changed on 9 September 2026, when the Ministry put the work back out to tender with a forty-two page geotechnical prescription attached — dated the day before, and written five years after the decision it is being used to carry out. What it settles, and what it does not, is set out further down this section.
What has been published is the 2025 version of the prescription, dated 7 November 2025 and available to anyone on the Ministry's own website. It lists 79 waypoints across 4,376 metres, each flagged in the field with ribbon and paint. It is not the prescription the club was given. That one was written 7 October 2020, revised 11 May 2021, and lists 91 waypoints over 0.0–4.395 km. We hold all three.
Seventy-five of those waypoints prescribe cross-ditches, fill pull-backs and water bars — work a grader could reverse in a week. Four prescribe full re-contour, which nothing reverses.
The switchback that carries the whole justification is one stretch of it, and the prescription marks exactly where that stretch starts and stops. Its Site Specific Issues column reads, in order, “Start of unstable SB / middle of unstable SB / End unstable SB” — stations 1+150 to 1+192. In ninety-three rows that is the only place the document calls the road unstable.
1+192 − 1+150 = 42 m
42 m ÷ 4,395 m = 0.0096 = 0.96%
The denominator is the prescription’s own header: “LOCATION: Rady FSR 0321.02 0.0-4.395 Km”. The works are scoped to all 4,395 metres; the instability finding is scoped to 42 of them. Roughly thirteen other switchbacks appear in the same table in routine drainage terms — a cross ditch, a swale, “Just upgrade of switch back” — and the word unstable is not used at any of them. That is not a finding that the road is free of hazard, and it is no charge against the prescriber, who wrote down what was found and exactly where. It is the proportion. The instability finding covers 0.96% of the road. The deactivation is prescribed for all 4,395 metres of it.
| Station | WP# | Works | Site Specific Issues | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1+150 | 21 | XD | Start of unstable SB | Drains to left and into lower XD at 1+160 M, catches H20 coming into SB |
| 1+150 | 21 | Start full pullback/re-contour | unstable switch back | Decompact, then waste pulled material on inside of old road and up cut bank |
| 1+170 | — | Pull back pullout to outer edge | middle of unstable SB | Decompact, then waste pulled material on inside and up cut bank |
| 1+192 | 22 | End full pullback/re-contour | End unstable SB | Taper back into XD and existing road |
| 1+192 | 22 | XD | End unstable SB | 1+150 Km XD above should drains into this one, by-passing SB |
They sit at three stations — 1+150, 1+170 and 1+192 — and the prescriber’s own words fix both ends of the stretch: “Start of unstable SB / middle of unstable SB / End unstable SB”. The length is therefore arithmetic, not inference: 1+192 − 1+150 = 42 m, the run from 1+150 to 1+192. Across the other eighty-eight rows the word never appears again.
The sheet’s own header gives the length being deactivated — 0.0-4.395 Km, or 4,395 m — so the share is 42 ÷ 4,395 = 0.0096, which is 0.96% of the road. Measured instead against the table’s last station, 4+840 — the prescriber’s field chainage for the same road — 42 ÷ 4,840 = 0.87%. The KML released with the prescription traces the centreline across 724 points and measures 4,394.9 metres, within a metre of the header. Whichever denominator you use, the stretch the prescription calls unstable is under one per cent of the road being removed, and the deactivation is prescribed for all of it.
Twenty-two rows mention a switchback, at twenty distinct stations. Five rows, at three stations, are the ones above. Thirteen of the remaining seventeen are drainage and nothing else — twelve cross ditches and one swale, under notes like “Just upgrade of switch back” and “Top of hill into switch back”. The last four rows are the pull-back lines at 2+310, 2+430 and 2+500–2+540. So four switchbacks get fill pulled back under a prescription line of their own — 1+150, 2+310, 2+430 and 2+500. One of the four is called unstable. Thirteen more are described in drainage terms and nothing worse.
The sheet is not silent about the ground elsewhere. Eighteen rows describe steep hill or steep terrain, five ask “Bedrock?”, eight record wet ground, seepage or pooled water, and three name perched fill — 2+610, 2+790 and 4+750 — fill packed onto a sidehill with nothing under it, each given its own pullback. The longest pullback on the road, 140 metres at 1+680–1+820, is prescribed for “Start steep terrain”, not for instability. That is the case the document does make. What it never does at any other station is call the road unstable, and in ninety-three rows it records no washout, no slide, no failure and no geotechnical reference.
Station 1+150 — the over-steepened switchback that is the stated reason the whole road must come out. Photographed by the club on 18 July 2021, with the Ministry’s survey stakes already planted.
A side-by-side with two people and a dog; a bike standing unattended. The cutslope above has shed rock — that material is real, and the prescription’s cross ditches are addressed to it. What the photographs do not show is a road that has failed. The club’s caption asks what the file still does not answer: “Why was The Code Red authorized on this road and who authorized it?”
Anyone who has spent time in these mountains will recognise this for what it is: an ordinary mountain switchback. Steep, narrow, loose on the cutbank — the normal condition of a forest service road in the Selkirks, and the condition it has been in for decades.
The prescription was released to the Trout Lake Recreational Club by the District Manager in July 2021. It names its author on the first page and again at the signature line.

Two other lines on the same page matter as much. “Access Level Remaining after Deact: NO ACCESS” — but that is the header on the revised copy. The original of 7 October 2020 reads “ATV”. The outcome was substituted on 11 May 2021, not arrived at. And “Date Prescribed: October 7, 2020” is the date the original was written — the file’s own embedded properties record it printed 27 April 2021 and modified 11 May 2021, fourteen days apart. The reversal came after the clubs signed the caribou stewardship agreement, and six weeks before the Regional Executive Director wrote that staff would work with the engineer to maintain “the highest possible level of access for future recreational use.”

The credential appears twice in the Ministry’s own document, and both copies released to the club are unsigned. The last two entries in the summary table are the two lines that would execute it — “Prescriber: B. Zimmermann, RFT ______” and “Date Signed: ______” — and both rules are empty. Neither line is redacted and neither is concealed: we opened the released workbook and read every row, and no row in it is hidden. It is simply an unexecuted document. The file’s embedded properties record its author and last-saved-by as “Zimmermann, Tina FLNR:EX”, and its filename begins TZ. Five years on, the prescription that removes 4,395 metres of public road has not been produced to anyone in signed and dated form. The request for the executed copy, and for the name and registration number of any professional engineer who sealed any part of it, is published here ready to file.

The file’s own metadata records the same author. It was last printed on 27 April 2021 and last modified on 11 May 2021 — the revision the district was working from while telling the club it would try to preserve access.

The District Manager — herself an RPF, not an engineer — states plainly who wrote it. An unnamed engineer is credited with recommendations for the switchback at 1+150–1+160. Nobody with that title authored the document, and in November 2021 the District Manager could not say whether any report existed. She also declines a site visit for the second time in three weeks, and Michael E. Ferguson of the Ministry is copied.
This section used to say we could find no evidence that a professional had assessed this road. That is no longer true, and we have rewritten it. A forty-two page geotechnical prescription dated 8 September 2026 went out with the re-tendered bid package the following day. What it is not is evidence about 2021 — which is when the claim below was made, in writing, to the BC Snowmobile Federation with the Minister copied, and when the decision it defends was taken.
“Deactivation on the Rady FSR was prescribed by a professional engineer.” — Garth Wiggill, Regional Executive Director, Kootenay Boundary, 22 June 2021. The same sentence is still being given to the public in 2026. The rows below take it in two parts: what the file contains now, and what it contained when the decision was taken.

The first sentence of the report, as page 3 renders. The two brackets are ours and mark where the page is blank; every other word is the document’s. Under the first box the file reads “Michael Ferguson, RFT, of”. Under the second it reads “SNT Geotechnical Ltd. (SNTG)”. The report as issued does not say on its face who asked for it, or who wrote it.

Under that box the file reads “Ryan Williams, P.Geo. of SNTG”. This is the only line in forty-two pages that names the professional who went to the road, and it is the line a reader most needs. On the page it is empty.
The rest of the section is shown whole so nothing is taken out of context: a walking traverse, warm and sunny, waypoints by GPS-enabled phone to about ±5 m, flagged with plain orange tape. That is the field method the prescription rests on, in the report’s own words.

Page 20 is the only one of the forty-two that is a scan rather than digital text — which is what a wet-signed page becomes. Its content stream draws that scan and then paints two rectangles over it, in the page’s own separation colour at zero tint, which is paper rather than ink: one of 57 × 38 points over the firm’s letterhead, and one of 395 × 192 points over the whole signature block. On the page as issued there is nothing under the closing paragraph but white space.
The lower panel is the same file with those two rectangles deleted from that one content stream and nothing else altered — no reconstruction, and no enhancement beyond a contrast stretch applied identically to both panels. It takes a few lines to reproduce from the published PDF, which is the point. Under the box: a Professional Geoscientist’s seal, R. J. Williams, #45161, signed and hand-dated Sept 8, 2026; below it Ryan Williams, P.Geo., Senior Geoscientist, SNT Geotechnical Ltd., SNTG Permit Number 1001083; and in the second column Tim Giles, P.Geo., who reviewed it. Neither name appears in the report’s searchable text, because this page has none.
The file records when it was made and nothing about why. It was produced from Microsoft Word by Acrobat Distiller on 9 September 2026 at 11:26 — the day after the date on the seal, and the day the re-tendered package was posted. The rectangles are part of the page content that conversion produced: the file carries no annotation layer, no second producer and no later edit. We do not know who applied them, or why, and we do not say.

Shown in the order it happened. At 2:06 pm the club asks for the engineer’s report by name — “This is the report The Club needs.” At 3:15 pm, sixty-nine minutes later, that is the answer. Four months after transmitting the prescription, asked directly for the engineering behind it, the District Manager does not produce it, does not name the engineer, and is not certain it exists.
“The district engineering technician created a deactivation prescription with the recommendations of a professional geoscientist for one particularly unstable section.” — Briefing Note for Information, Tara DeCourcy, District Manager, to Garth Wiggill, Regional Executive Director, 6 July 2021 ↗Six days later she told the club the same stretch carried “the recommendations of a geotechnical engineer”. On 26 October the Ministry’s stock reply returned to “prescribed by a professional engineer.” Under the Engineers and Geoscientists Regulation, B.C. Reg. 14/2021, in force since 5 February 2021, those are not two words for one thing: professional engineer and professional geoscientist are separate titles, each reserved by law for its own class of registrant, with separate scopes. Geoscience covers “the investigation of surface or subsurface geological conditions”; engineering covers advice “based on an engineering discipline.” One person can hold both. This one has never been named, and no report of that review has ever been produced, so the file cannot settle which it was.What this does — and does not — show. The separation is real. Schedule 1, s. 5 of the Professional Governance Act, SBC 2018, c. 47 defines professional engineer and professional geoscientist as separate registration categories with separate regulated practices, and the titles themselves are reserved — s. 51(1)(a) of that Act, and ss. 4 and 8 of the Engineers and Geoscientists Regulation, which puts engineering in Part 2 and geoscience in Part 3. They are not two words for one qualification. But no rule required an engineer here, and we do not say one was broken. The deactivation provision the Ministry itself listed on the intake form for this project — s. 82 of the Forest Planning and Practices Regulation — imposes its duties on “a person” and names no profession at all. The word qualified does not appear anywhere in that regulation, or in the Forest and Range Practices Act. The one BC regulation that ever did require a professional to prepare a deactivation prescription — the Forest Road Regulation, B.C. Reg. 351/2002, s. 15(2) — was repealed on 31 January 2004, and even it called for a qualified registered professional, defined by education, experience and membership of whichever regulatory body governs the activity. Not an engineer. So the discrepancy is not illegality. It is that the Ministry described its own reviewer three different ways in its own records — a professional engineer, a geotechnical engineer, and a professional geoscientist — gave the public the first, and has never named the person or produced the report that would settle which it was.Wiggill 22 Jun 2021 · Briefing note 6 Jul 2021 · DeCourcy 12 Jul 2021 · Ministry stock reply 26 Oct 2021 · Engineers and Geoscientists Regulation ss. 2, 4, 6, 8 ↗ · Professional Governance Act, Schedule 1 s. 5 and s. 51(1)(a) ↗ · Forest Planning and Practices Regulation s. 82 ↗ · Forest Road Regulation B.C. Reg. 351/2002, repealed by B.C. Reg. 7/2004 ↗ · Sections listed by the Ministry on the intake form, 27 Apr 2021 ↗
Two questions, and the answers are not the same. A professional geoscientist walked this road on 18 August 2026, and a forty-two page prescription followed three weeks later. We do not dispute it and we do not diminish it. It is evidence about the ground in August 2026 — not about a decision taken in 2021, and it does not claim to be.
On the 2021 claim, nothing has changed. Take the Ministry’s account at its highest and it still does not reach it. Its own documents say an engineer reviewed one switchback — “this part of the prescription.” A Regional Executive Director turned that into the professional prescription of a 4,395-metre road. The first statement cannot support the second, on any reading.
And the first statement has never been substantiated. No report of that review has ever been produced. That engineer has never been named. Nothing from 2021 is signed or sealed. Asked directly, the District Manager twice said she believed none was ever written — “I don’t think a specific report was completed”, “I believe the recommendations were made on site” — and undertook to confirm that with the prescriber. No confirmation is in the released record. Five years on, nothing further has come.
If anything, the new document sharpens the point. This road was walked by a professional on 18 August 2026 and the report is dated 8 September — the day before the work went back out to tender. The only earlier deactivation document that assessment records having reviewed is the Ministry’s own, which it describes as “not dated”, and no earlier engineering report on this road appears on that list. That list is what one consultant reviewed, not a register of what exists, so it does not prove nothing was written in 2021. It is simply that after five years of asking, the earliest professional assessment of this road anyone can point to is three weeks old. And it was not asked whether the road should come out — the report records, in its own bold and before its deactivation plan begins, that “the road is intended to be deactivated to a permanent standard.”
The prescription is dated. So is everything the Ministry told the community. Put the two side by side and the sequence is not ambiguous.
The prescription released to the club in 2021 and the one published on the Ministry’s website in 2025 are the same instrument. The waypoint count changed. The author’s credential, the design intent and the unstable switchback did not.
Before any of the reversal, the same prescriber had already worked out how to stabilise this ground and leave people a way through. It was the plan of record for seven months.

The original header. There is no Revised line on this version.

At the same switchback now given as the reason the whole road must come out, the instruction was to take the fill back and keep a trail. The line appears twice, on consecutive rows. Two rows up: “Decompact & waste material on inside ditch-use to build up ATV trail.”

At the bottom of the work, a barricade an ATV could pass. In the May 2021 revision that became a ninety-metre re-contour, and the note reads that the re-contour “will act as a barricade.”
Stabilising this switchback and keeping access were never alternatives. The Ministry’s own technical staff designed a version that did both, and it stood as the plan for seven months.
Nor can the licensee explain the change. Whatever the Ministry believed about Cooper Creek Cedar’s intentions, both permit sections are still active today — and the October 2020 prescription, written before the Ministry ever put those intentions on paper, still specified ATV.
So the reversal was not forced by the ground, and not forced by the licensee. Something changed between October and May, and the record does not say what — or who decided it.
Between these two emails nothing changed on the ground. The same officer wrote to those same five — the heli-ski operator, ATVBC, a lodge, a mill and a resident — then to those five and a sixth, and reversed the undertaking entirely.

She is specific about the difficulty and specific about the intent: the switchback at 1+150–1+160 will make it hard, keeping access will cost stability, and it is “not the first preferred option by the Professional Engineer.” Even so — “FLNRORD realises the heavy current ATV use by the public on this road and will attempt to achieve both stabilising the road and maintaining ATV access.”
Read the engineer’s role carefully. He is “the Professional Engineer who reviewed this part of the prescription with me” — a document, reviewed with the person who wrote it. Nothing on the record says he attended the site, and he is never named.

Her own email acknowledges the reversal: “In the previous referral to you shown below, it was stated we would attempt to leave ATV access open at the expense of stability.” This is the day the prescription file was last saved.
And here is the reason the Ministry gave its own stakeholders in May 2021. District management decided that “protecting the Caribou Habitat within the GAR area” and stabilising the perched sections “were priorities over maintaining public access for recreational purposes.” Caribou is named first, and the input came from a wildlife biologist with the BC Caribou Recovery Program. This is the reason as it stood that month, not the reason as it stands now — by October the Ministry was telling the public the decision was not based on caribou at all, and four more reasons have followed since.
And here is exactly who “you” was. The 28 April notification went to five addresses; this reversal went to those five and a sixth: daveb@cmhheli.com, the heli-ski operator; kim@atvbc.ca, the ATV association; julius@grizzlybearranch.ca, a lodge; dan@porcupinewood.com, a wood-products contractor; and two residents, [resident’s private address] and [resident’s private address]. Not one is a government address. Recreation Sites and Trails BC — the office holding the club’s trail maps, and the only body that could have designated these routes — is not on the list. Neither is the Trout Lake Recreational Club. The heli-ski operator that had told the Ministry its runs were being affected by “unregulated snowmobile use from Trout Lake” is on both lists. The organisation those snowmobilers ride with is on neither. ↗
Set the engineering aside for a moment. The prescription changed, and the file records the order it changed in.
In 2021 the Ministry of Forests made four commitments about this road. Each one was made in writing. Each one was made to people who had asked politely and in good faith. Not one of them was kept.
The reasons changed too. The road had to go because a logging licensee was walking away. Then it was not about caribou — strictly about public safety. Then the caribou came back. Then there was no money. Then the public had already been consulted.
Five years, five reasons, four broken promises, and one road that is still scheduled to come out before the snow.
The same 2021 form the Ministry used to consult First Nations also told them what kind of road this is. That description is wrong, and the government’s own recreation officer contradicted it five years later.
The claim: “Currently the FSR can only be travelled by ATV as steeper road sections have deep surface scour and the tight switchbacks cannot accommodate a 4WD vehicle.” — Consultation Request Intake Form, 27 April 2021.

The orange highlight is ours. The yellow one is in the Ministry’s document. Everything else is as released.
| Tenure | Registered | Area | Road it crosses | Registered owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1081046 | 8 Feb 2021 · claim | 513.2 ha | R07745 | Red Pony Exploration Ltd |
| 1081048 | 8 Feb 2021 · claim | 513.4 ha | R07745 | Red Pony Exploration Ltd |
| 1089231 | 20 Jan 2022 · claim | 61.6 ha | R07745 | Red Pony Exploration Ltd |
| 1106383 | 29 Jul 2023 · claim | 41.0 ha | Rady FSR and R07745 | Adamowicz, Robert John |
| 1126383 | 26 Sep 2025 · application | 82.1 ha | R07745 | Funk, Kelly Brent |
| 1132739 | 1 May 2026 · claim | 20.5 ha | R07745 | Scott, Steven Jeffrey |
| 19 AUGUST 2026 — THE SECTION 57 DECISION | ||||
| 1137735 | 27 Aug 2026 · application | 1,409.1 ha | R07745 | Gustafsson, Cody Daniel |
| 1137802 | 28 Aug 2026 · claim | 123.1 ha | Rady FSR | Bakus, John Nick |
| 1138129 | 28 Aug 2026 · claim | 184.6 ha | Rady FSR | Bakus, John Nick |
Nine mineral tenures cross this corridor. Six were on the register before 19 August 2026, and five of those six sit on road permit R07745 — the lower road, below the FSR — not on the Rady FSR at all. Exactly one is on the Rady FSR itself: tenure 1106383, 41.0 ha, registered 29 July 2023 to Robert John Adamowicz. The register’s own name for it is “RADY CREEK MCX - TROUT LK”. On this road, that is the only holder the phrase can reasonably mean.
Three more tenures were registered after the decision: 1137735 on 27 August, eight days after, and 1137802 and 1138129 on 28 August, nine days after. The last two lie directly on the Rady FSR. We publish that as a fact of the register and nothing further. We have no evidence of any connection between the decision and the staking, and we do not suggest one.
Two limits, and they matter. This layer is a live snapshot, not a point-in-time record: it shows the register as it stood on 30 August 2026, so a tenure that lapsed between 19 and 30 August would not appear here at all. And ownership as at the decision date cannot be rebuilt from the public service either — the history layer, MTA_ACQUIRED_TENURE_HISTORY_SP, carries geometry revisions only, with no owner field and no date field. What stood on the register on 19 August is not something this record can settle.Tenure numbers, registration dates, areas and registered owner names are fields of the public mineral titles register; nothing beyond those fields is published here. Crown-granted mineral claims are a separate layer — fifty fall inside the same search box, and none of their polygons crosses either road. MTA_CROWN_GRANT_MIN_CLAIM_SVW ↗

The surveyor’s own note at the top of the road, beside “9.83 Km from HWY.” This crop is the 7 October 2020 sheet — header ATV — but the row is unchanged in the 11 May 2021 NO ACCESS revision.

The club’s own description, written to the Ministry. The wording is theirs.

This is the header of the form carrying the description above. The copy released to us is page one; it ends at “MAPPING & GEOSPATIAL DATA”.
And the form is where the shape of that decision should be recorded. It prints both routes — single-agency and multi-agency — and marks neither.

That is the difference between other agencies deciding with you and other agencies being sent a notice, and the form does not record which of them happened here. What it does record is a single decision maker: under AUTHORIZATION TYPE it reads District Manager responsible / Forest Service Road. Recreation Sites and Trails BC — the agency holding the club’s trail maps, and the only one that could have designated this road — appears nowhere on the page. No referral to it, and no reply from it, appears in anything released to us, and it is on neither of the stakeholder notifications the district did send — five recipients on 28 April 2021, six on 11 May (section 04). We hold page one only; if a route was recorded, it was recorded on a page we have not been given. Nothing on the form is marked, and we have added no emphasis of our own. The term on the form runs 27 April 2021 to 31 March 2026; the work was scheduled for August 2026 and was re-tendered on 9 September 2026.
2021: “can only be travelled by ATV.” 2026: “highway vehicle interest.” Every summer this road carries full-size pickups and 4x4s to the alpine, and the people who drive and maintain this road in them are missing from every description the Ministry wrote. Why?
Between April and October 2021 the Ministry described this deactivation to four different audiences. The descriptions do not agree with each other. All four are in writing.
The premise was that engineering required this. Each audience got a version shaped to what it was likely to accept.
Consultation was run on the 27 April description. NO ACCESS replaced it fourteen days later. The referral was answered on a description of the project that no longer existed — and there is no record in anything released to us of that referral being run again.
The engineering did not drive this. The prescriber said so in her own transmittal: the document she sent was “my amended prescription once no ATV access was decided.” The access outcome came first. The prescription was amended to match it. The record still does not say who decided.
Correspondence from 2021, held by the Trout Lake Recreational Club and provided to us in full. In June the club and the BC Snowmobile Federation asked to meet the engineer and walk the road. In October the Ministry postponed the work and put the reason in writing.

The same day the letter arrived, BCSF asked to sit down with the engineer who wrote the prescription and review the plan — with the explicit goal of deactivating in a way that addressed the environmental concern while keeping snowmobile access. That meeting never happened. The prescriber’s name reached the club only when the document itself was released a year later.

The meeting was the Ministry’s own offer. The club replied two hours and nineteen minutes later with five dates.

Jeanine Ross, Secretary-Treasurer of the Trout Lake Recreational Club, put five dates on the table — June 29, or July 6, 7, 8 or 9 — to meet at Rady Creek and look at the road together. The reply came seven days later: “as much as I would love to meet you on site I just won’t have the time to do so.” Skype, Teams or Zoom were offered in its place, if the club would arrange the call.

The Ministry postponed the work in the autumn of 2021 and said in writing why: to allow for consultation. The covering note makes clear this was not a private assurance — “a bit of what has been sent to most people who have written”. The same promise went to everyone who wrote in.
Five years later, no consultation for Rady Creek appears anywhere on the record. The same letter also states that the decision “is not based on the importance of the habitat for Caribou recovery” and rests “strictly on public safety” — a reason the Ministry has cited repeatedly since.
Thirty kilometres from Rady Creek, the same district office deactivated another Forest Service Road — the Incomappleux, FSR 3397. Same decision-maker, same years. That one got a published FAQ, mailed notice three years running, a newspaper advertisement, a formal comment period and draft prescriptions released for review. Rady Creek got a map and a data file, sent to a lumber company.Frequently Asked Questions — Incomappleux Forest Service Road Deactivation · Ministry of Forests · April 2025 · file 11250-30/3397 ↗
The Ministry cannot argue it did not know what proper consultation looks like. It ran one thirty kilometres away and documented every step. It cannot argue nobody asked, because two organisations asked in writing and a third offered five dates. And it cannot argue the promise was never made, because it made that promise to everyone who wrote in. What it can do is run out the clock — and that is what it has done for five years.

The chain reads newest first, so it runs backwards. Four exchanges, forty-nine minutes.
2:55 pm — a member of the public’s letter arrives and is passed along: “And another one. At least these people are from BC.” That letter had asked about search-and-rescue access, wildfire response, people who cannot climb from the valley bottom, and the Alice Jowett memorial.
3:23 pm — “I think we will treat this as a letter writing campaign now and just create a stock response.”
3:27 pm — the officer is holding the letters, unanswered.
3:36 pm — “Anything addressed to the minister will come to us through CLIFF and be answered by the RED, so you can just throw those ones away.”
CLIFF is the ministry’s correspondence tracking system; RED is the Regional Executive Director.
Three months later it went out, the same letter to everyone who had written in.

Read it against the email chain above and it is not a reply at all. It is the product of a decision taken at 3:23 that July afternoon: treat the public as a letter writing campaign, and issue a stock response.
It deflects rather than answers. The letters had asked about search and rescue, wildfire access, and people who cannot climb from the valley bottom. None of it is addressed. What the letter offers instead is delay — the work “will be postponed until next year” — which costs the Ministry nothing and concedes nothing.
Two of its assurances are also false on the Ministry’s own file. “In most cases, the district tries to maintain some type of vehicle access” — by the date of this letter the prescription had read NO ACCESS for five months. “Prescribed by a professional engineer” — it names a Registered Forest Technologist, and no engineering report exists.Ministry response relayed by MLA Katrine Conroy’s office, 26 October 2021
If running out the clock is the Ministry’s strategy, then the permit is the clock. Four years into the deactivation plan, the Province took the club’s $250 permit fee — plus the $25 habitat conservation trust fund surcharge — and issued it a fresh five-year authorisation to ride the very area this road serves. Nineteen months later the excavators were booked. Both documents are the Province’s. Only one of them can be honoured.

The permit exempts club members from the Motor Vehicle Prohibition Regulation across the Central Selkirk Snowmobile Management Area. It succeeds CB19-598335, which ran from January 2020. Both rest on a Stewardship Management Agreement the Province co-signed. The Province negotiated it, issued the permits under it, and is now removing the ground access the permitted activity depends on. The authorisation runs more than three years past the month the road is due to come out.
The two amounts are printed on the face of the permit — PERMIT FEE $250.00 and HCTF SURCHARGE $25.00 — and they are set by regulation, not negotiated. Schedule 3 of the Wildlife Act Permit Regulation, B.C. Reg. 253/2000, sets a $50 fee and a $5 habitat conservation trust fund surcharge for a permit under section 3 (2), the exemption section this permit is issued under. Section 22 (3) makes those “the annual fee and habitat conservation trust fund surcharge that are to be charged for each full year or portion of a year for which the permit is issued.” Five years, so $250 and $25. The amounts are unchanged in the consolidation current to 25 August 2026. ↗

The permit is not the only thing the Province granted. Recounting it in August 2026, the recreation officer says his office told the club that “authorization was not needed to utilize these roads for public use” — and then went further, approving trail names and directional signage on them. The Province put its own wayfinding on this corridor and told the public it was theirs to use. Signage, a stewardship agreement, and two Wildlife Act permits: four separate acts of recognition, each one made by the same government now removing the road they point along.
Club members say it plainly in the LetsGetLost documentary: they handed the province their full trail list in 2017 — the list that produced these signs — and watched the areas on that list narrow and close ever since, in step with what the heli-ski operators were asking for. That is their testimony, on the record, in a published film. Whether the two were connected is not something we can show from the documents, and we do not claim it. What the operators asked for in writing is set out in section 07.
British Columbia keeps a public lobbyist registry. Every registered contact between a lobbyist and a senior public official is filed, dated, numbered and searchable by anyone. It takes ten minutes to learn to use, and anyone can see who the government is spending its time listening to on matters of public interest.
Directly behind Silvercup Ridge sits Galena Lodge, operated by Canadian Mountain Holidays. Its own management plan states the size outright — “The tenure covers 1167.44 sq km”, which is 116,744 hectares — and its title page names the tenure that figure belongs to: MFLNRO file 4401094, the Licence of Occupation #340826 CMH was applying to replace for a further 45 years. The Province’s own mapping agrees with its licensee. In the TANTALIS crown-tenures layer of the BC Geographic Warehouse, captured 30 August 2026, the polygon filed under 4401094 — document 340826, commercial recreation / heli ski, Trout Lake, disposition in good standing — measures 116,704 hectares. That is 0.03% from the number in the plan: the operator’s claim and the government’s map are the same tenure. Galena is one of six CMH areas in the tenure-replacement file the Province released — Gothics, Adamants, Galena, Monashees, Revelstoke and Bobbie Burns — and the areas those six plans state for themselves add to 7,349 square kilometres, about 735,000 hectares. All of it is commercial recreation tenure issued by the Ministry of Forests. ↗ The industry association for heli-skiing and cat-skiing is HeliCat Canada, and it retains two registered consultant lobbyists: Greg D’Avignon and Berit Beattie. D’Avignon’s registration — number 1251-6130, opened 14 July 2025 and still active — answers “Yes” to whether he will be arranging meetings between a public office holder and the client. ↗ The twelve-month summary records that the consultant “has lobbied, or plans to lobby a member of the Legislative Assembly, including a Minister or Premier.” ↗
Those 162 filings are not history. Between December 2025 and July 2026, HeliCat's registered contacts include near-monthly meetings with the Director and a policy specialist of the provincial Wildlife Branch — the officials who run the caribou file that has been used to close this terrain. It reached two deputy ministers repeatedly across May, June and July of this year. It reached the Deputy Minister to the Premier. It reached the Minister of Environment and Parks directly.
In the same period, the people who use Rady Creek wrote letters. Steve Shannon's 2020–21 petition, which he says drew over nine thousand signatures and he believes passed ten thousand, went to the Minister of Forests and got nothing back. The petition the club is running now is a separate one, and its total is not a recollection: the archived capture of the Change.org page records 7,639 verified signatures as at 26 August 2026. ↗ When seventy people gathered at Trout Lake in July and invited the Ministry, it sent natural resource officers — who told the crowd they were not permitted past the barricade.
Access to public land in this province is being decided in rooms that recreational users have never been in. One industry association has more registered meetings with this government in thirteen months than every motorised recreation group in British Columbia has had in a decade. That is not a coincidence of scale. It is what a closed process produces.
The lobbying registry shows that the meetings happened. It does not show what was said in them. What was said is partly on the public record already — three freedom-of-information packages the Province released in 2023 and 2024, published on its own disclosure site. We did not request them. We went and read them.
Three freedom-of-information packages came back — 108 pages, covering the same years. They are heli-ski tenure files: six Licences of Occupation under review, caribou conditions, GPS flight data, tenure term. Every page is published below, and every exhibit links to the original release on the Province's own open information portal.
Read together they show what the registry cannot. Through the years either side of this decision, the commercial operator flying Silvercup Ridge was telling the Ministry of Forests in writing — to the officials deciding its licences — that public recreation on that ridge was a problem for its business.
When the Province wanted data from the companies flying this terrain, it invited their chief executives to meet the Minister and asked for it voluntarily. They declined, for years, and kept operating. When seventy people gathered at Trout Lake and asked to meet the decision-makers, the Ministry sent enforcement officers, who told them they could not pass the barricade.

Mining and forestry must observe timing windows and setback distances, and must supply detailed spatial data on their operations. Four bullets later in the same note, data from heli-tourism operators is to be provided on a voluntary basis. Recreational users are not asked for anything, because they are simply closed out of the terrain.

The Province records that it has sought flight path data for several years and that HeliCat has not provided it — while some individual operators have. The association’s stated objections: the data might become public, the industry is being unfairly targeted, and there is no clear plan for its use. The same page notes limited evidence that operators comply with the recommended two-kilometre setback from caribou.

Forestry and mining took steps to support caribou recovery. The briefing note states plainly that the lack of similar improvements from the adventure tourism sector diminishes the credibility of the Province’s own recovery efforts. Prepared for Deputy Minister John Allan, three days before the Trout Lake clubs signed their stewardship agreement.

The Ministry writes that HeliCat Canada has historically resisted requests to voluntarily supply GPS flight data and may resume lobbying efforts to block these changes. This is the government anticipating, in a decision document, that an industry association will lobby against a caribou measure.
CMH Galena Heli-ski Management Plan, 15 July 2020 — filed with the Ministry in support of a request to replace Licence of Occupation #340826 for a further 45-year term. The tenure covers 1,167 square kilometres. Silvercup Ridge is one of its thirteen ski zones.
FOR-2023-31283 · CMH Galena Management Plan · zone description · 15 July 2020
Gov release ↗ ↗
In the description of its Silver Cup zone, the operator records that the runs are “becoming increasingly affected by (and less useable as a result of) unregulated snowmobile use from Trout Lake.” The town is named. The ridge is named. The document is dated eight months before the Trout Lake clubs learned the road was going.

Under a heading that opens by stating the operation “do not restrict public access in any way,” the plan goes on to record rising snowmobile use “particularly in the vicinity of Silver Cup Ridge” and concludes: “There are some areas that we can no longer ski due to the snowmobile traffic.”
FOR-2023-31283 · Dave Butler, CMH, to Tracy Ronmark, Director of Authorizations · Nov 2022
Gov release ↗ ↗
Writing to the official deciding six of its tenure replacements, CMH lists its grievances: tenure term, wildlife issues, old growth deferrals, and “lack of management of public recreation.” Elsewhere in the same correspondence, “growing unmanaged public recreation” is described as “creating both safety and experiential issues for us.” The sector, he writes, faces “a death by a thousand cuts.”

The conditions the Ministry proposed attaching to the renewed licences: record every caribou sighting, track all GPS flight data including flight paths and landing locations, report twice yearly, and do not operate within 2,000 metres horizontally or 500 metres vertically of caribou. For Galena, a referral recommendation asks that a temporarily closed area in critical caribou winter range become permanently closed, amendable only if the herd is extirpated.
The plan above names Silver Cup Ridge, and names the town whose snowmobilers it says are the problem. This is where that terrain sits on the Province’s own mapping. Silvercup Ridge is inside the Galena tenure. The Rady FSR is outside it, and stops 723 metres short of the boundary. The road is the ground route into tenured terrain — it is not tenured ground, and nothing in the tenure record gives CMH any interest in the road itself.
| Feature | Inside CMH Galena tenure 4401094? | Distance to that boundary |
|---|---|---|
| Rady FSR 0321.02 | NO — none of its 724 mapped points | 723 m outside the boundary |
| Road permit R07745 | NO — no sampled point | 1,282 m outside the boundary |
| Silvercup Ridge | YES | 464 m inside the boundary |
The tenure measured here is the one the plan above was filed for. The Province’s tenure layer records it as Crown lands file 4401094, tenure document 340826, purpose commercial recreation / heli ski, location Trout Lake, status disposition in good standing. Those are the same two numbers the released plan carries — “MFLNRO File Number: 4401094”, and a request to replace “the existing License of Occupation (#340826)”. The polygon measures 116,704 ha against the 116,744 ha the plan states for itself: 0.03 per cent apart.
The road’s own tenure record is a different record and says nothing about heli-skiing. FTEN_ROAD_SECTION_LINES_SVW lists section 0321.02 as ACTIVE, named “TROUT LAKE-RADY CR”, mapped length 4.396 km, held by the Selkirk Forest District.
The closures run the other way. Every one of the 724 mapped points on the Rady FSR falls inside the Central Selkirk Snowmobile Management Area — 97,501 ha, carried in that layer as a legal closure — and inside ungulate winter range u-4-014, 253,165 ha. Of the 4,291 points on road permit R07745, 2,771 fall inside the snowmobile closure and 2,682 inside the winter range. Silvercup Ridge is inside both. The closure covers the road. The tenure does not.Central Selkirk closure · AMA_SNOWMOBILE_MGMT_AREAS_SP · retrieved 30 August 2026 ↗ · winter range · WCP_UNGULATE_WINTER_RANGE_SP · same date ↗
And here is what this record cannot show. The word Rady does not appear anywhere in the 85 pages of FOR-2023-31283 — not once. The Galena plan never states its own boundary either: it places the operating area “north, east and south of Trout Lake” and otherwise says only “see approved Management Plan map”. That map is not in the release. In this record the boundary exists only as the polygon in the Province’s tenure layer — which is the polygon measured above.Distances computed in EPSG:3005, BC Albers metres, from the archived responses. Each query, its HTTP headers and its SHA-256 checksum are filed with the archive.
Everything above is CMH writing to the Ministry about its tenures. This is the Ministry writing to CMH about Rady Creek itself — the two 2021 emails that promised ATV access and then withdrew it, sent to the same private list — five recipients, then six.

Above: the complaint itself, nine months before the notification — CMH’s own management plan, reproduced in full as Exhibit 05 below.
The 28 April notification went to five: CMH, ATVBC, Grizzly Bear Ranch, Porcupine Wood Products and one resident. The 11 May reversal went to those five plus a second resident. Both notification emails are reproduced in full in section 04.↗ Every one outside government — and the Trout Lake Recreational Club is not among them. The club is not hard to reach: the letter it sent the District Manager in November 2025 came from its own address, the same one it has used with the Ministry throughout. ATVBC, a provincial association, was the only recreation organisation on the list. The club whose members ride this road was not written to at all.
Nine months before that notification went out, CMH had told the Ministry in its own management plan that the Silver Cup runs were “becoming increasingly affected by (and less useable as a result of) unregulated snowmobile use from Trout Lake”, and that there were “areas that we can no longer ski due to the snowmobile traffic.” It then received both halves of what the district decided about the road those snowmobilers use: on 28 April 2021, “Every effort will be made to maintain ATV access”; on 11 May 2021, “NO ATV ACCESS LEFT OPEN AFTER THE RADY FSR IS PERMANENTLY DEACTIVATED”.
Same ridge, two users, and only one of them in the room. The clubs signed the caribou stewardship agreement in February 2021 and gave up riding area; the operation flying the same terrain faced no equivalent restriction, and was on the notification list for the road the clubs use. Nothing released to us shows CMH asking for this road to be deactivated — but it did not need to ask to be told, and the people it was complaining about were not.
Released with headers intact — sender, recipient, timestamp, subject line. These are the exchanges between the operator and the officials deciding its tenures.

The header establishes the relationship the rest of this section rests on. CMH’s Director of Sustainability is corresponding directly with the Ministry of Forests Director of Authorizations for the Kootenay-Boundary region — the region containing Trout Lake and Rady Creek — about six Licences of Occupation awaiting decision.

The long submission. Butler responds point by point, in italics, to the Ministry’s position on tenure term, caribou conditions and flight data. It is a lobbying document in the ordinary sense of the word — an operator putting its case to a decision-maker while a decision is pending.

Butler sets out what he calls a contradiction: being asked to do more on stewardship — flight data, greater separation distance from wildlife — at greater cost, while being offered shorter tenures. In the same breath he lists the pressures the company is under, and public recreation is one of them.

The closing appeal. “Lack of management of public recreation” sits in a list of grievances put to the person deciding the tenures, alongside a request that she weigh all of it — “not just what you receive from your government colleagues.”

The conditions the Ministry proposed writing into the renewed licences — and, for the Galena file specifically, a referral recommendation that a temporary caribou closure become permanent, amendable only in the event of extirpation. This is the ask that HeliCat had resisted for years, arriving as a tenure condition.

The government side of the same room. Senior officials across two ministries coordinating a briefing note for the Deputy Minister ahead of another meeting with the industry coalition — one of many. No equivalent thread exists for the recreation groups using this terrain, because no equivalent meetings took place.
Through the same years the registry records those meetings, the operator flying Silvercup Ridge was putting a documented commercial case to the Ministry of Forests: public recreation on that ridge was reducing what it could sell, and the sector wanted it managed. That case went to named officials, in writing, while decisions on its licences were pending. The people who use the road were in none of those rooms.
In August 2026 Tyler at LetsGetLost spent two days on this road and in Trout Lake,
checking the government's stated reasons against what residents, prospectors and
club members told him — and against records obtained under freedom of information.
One frame carries the whole claim: the riding area the club had, and the piece of it still open.
“We’re down to 95% of our riding area is gone.”Trout Lake Recreational Club · in the film at 8:30
The film’s own graphic, on screen while that number is said. The colour key is the club’s, given earlier in the same interview: “the green shows everywhere that we used to snowmobile, and the orange shows where we can snowmobile now” — so the green is the former extent and the orange is what remains. It is an extent map only: it carries no trail names and no legend, and nothing on it can be read at the level of an individual route. Documentary at 4:47, 7:44 and 8:30. ↗
Just over fifty people live in Trout Lake full-time. This is what they told him.
“Just got the cold shoulder. No response, nothing.”Steve Shannon · Original petition organiser · Kootenay SAR volunteer
He is careful about the number on camera: “I’d have to check the exact numbers, but it was over 9,000. I think it ended up being well over 10,000 signatures on it.” That was the 2020–21 petition, not the one the club is running now. He sent it to the Minister of Forests and heard back nothing at all.
“We’ve been cut by 90% of our snowmobiling area.”Jeanine · Trout Lake Recreational Club
She holds up the before and after of the club’s riding area. If Rady Creek goes, she says, it is 95%.
“That’s not the deal we made.”Jeanine · Trout Lake Recreational Club
The club handed Recreation Sites and Trails BC its full trail list in 2017. One by one, every trail on that list was deactivated except two.
“That’s like killing the patient to cure the cold.”Warren Mirko · Founder, Public Land Use Society
The Ministry’s offer: it removes the road and re-contours the slope first, and claim holders may then apply for a permit to rebuild it.
“A convenient lie.”Thomas Gardner · Taranis Resources · wilderness first responder
Asked whether closing the road protects the public. Gardner is a wilderness first responder and a volunteer with local search and rescue.
“Another stroke of the pen, displacing the people who made their lives here.”Thomas Gardner · Taranis Resources
His family left Scotland in the Highland Clearances. Ferguson, the ghost town below this ridge, is named for the Scot who founded it.
“They decided it wasn’t a high recreation value place. We just weren’t important.”Jeanine · Trout Lake Recreational Club
On being left out of the room while commercial operators behind the same ridge sat in monthly meetings with deputy ministers.
“They say they did, but they did not.”Darryl Davis · Davis Mining and Exploration Corp
On the Ministry’s account that it contacted the claim, Crown grant and private property holders above the road.
“You can’t say you’re protecting the environment while leaving toxic mine sites to leach into the streams.”Steve Shannon · Original petition organiser · Kootenay SAR volunteer
Historic workings across this area were never remediated. Removing the road removes the only way to get equipment in to do it.
The Province withheld maintenance funding from this class of road for more than a decade and kept no records of what that did. The designation that would have restored the funding never came, and nothing released to us shows it was ever considered — after the community had done everything the agency asked of it. When the club finally applied in 2026 the answer was not a refusal on the merits but a jurisdictional one: the guideline excludes Forest Service Roads, and the officer pointed at a different instrument in a different ministry. It told the clubs in 2021 that the road had to go because a logging licensee was giving up the permit below it — then produced an unpublished safety opinion to justify removal, on a road it had never inspected to a standard it could produce. It promised consultation in writing to everyone who wrote in, then skipped the consultation process it had just run, in full, thirty kilometres away. And through all of it, the commercial operator behind the same ridge sat in monthly meetings with the deputy ministers and wildlife officials making these calls, while the people who use this road could not get a reply to a petition its organiser puts at over nine thousand signatures. That same operator had already told the Ministry, in writing, that snowmobiles from Trout Lake were making Silvercup Ridge less useable.
The Auditor General was clear that none of this was required. In its own words: “there is no trigger or timeline for deactivation and FSRs can remain open indefinitely if they are maintained as wilderness roads” — Management of Forest Service Roads, p. 11. A forest service road can stay exactly where it is, indefinitely, if someone pays to maintain it. Removal is not an obligation. It is a decision — and it can be unmade this week by one instruction from the Minister's office.
Rady Creek is one road. But the mechanism that condemned it — no transition pathway, no designation, no consultation, no record — is now becoming standard operating procedure for public access across British Columbia, as more and more roads go unmaintained to the standard the government’s own engineers asked for.
Decisions to close roads are being made behind closed doors, to satisfy the financial interests of the Ministry and private-sector lobbyists, without ever doing the technical engineering or the public consultation. Auditors have been calling this out at the Ministry of Forests since 2008. Nothing seemingly has changed.
In this district alone, four more roads are already in the queue. There is no process anywhere in the province for turning a retired industrial road into a managed recreation route. The only tool the Ministry has is the excavator.
The pattern will not stop at Trout Lake unless it is stopped at Trout Lake.
This is the gap underpinning everything that needs fixing about public access to the backcountry, and the reason we are bringing this to the public with a solution in hand.
When a Forest Service Road stops being needed for logging, British Columbia has exactly one tool for it: deactivation. There is no mechanism to hand that same corridor to Recreation Sites and Trails BC and keep it open as a managed recreation route.
Not a slow mechanism. Not an underfunded one. None. The Ministry of Forests cannot transfer a road footprint into the recreation system, because no pathway to do it has ever been built.
So when the industrial use ends, the only question a district can answer is how much of the road to destroy. And the Ministry told the Trout Lake club exactly what that means in practice: the road must be deactivated first — the slope returned to its pre-road condition — after which the club is welcome to apply for a permit and rebuild access over the same ground.
The BC Snowmobile Federation has put a four-point proposal in front of the Minister of Forests. It is not a demand to keep every road open forever. It is a request to build the missing pathway, and to use Rady Creek to build it.
This is the one place on this page where we are reading a regulation rather than quoting a document, so the regulation is printed here in full, from the King’s Printer, with the prescription beside it. It does not build the missing pathway — section 82 hands nobody a trail, a manager or a maintenance budget. It settles one narrower thing: what a deactivation barricade has to stop.

The head of the same page, read on 30 August 2026. The regulation was last amended on 1 January 2026, and section 82 itself was last touched by B.C. Reg. 62/2024. This is the text in force for the work re-tendered in September 2026, not a superseded one.

Read the sentence as it is written. The barricade has to prevent access by motor vehicles — and then, before the semicolon, the regulation names the one class it is not required to stop: all-terrain vehicles. Delete those four words and a deactivation barricade must stop everything on wheels. Leave them in, as the Province did, and a quad is the single thing that may still get through. This is not a loophole we went looking for. It is the exception the Province wrote into its own rule — and it is the only exception in the sentence.
Section 82 (1) (a) is the barricade requirement for every road deactivation in British Columbia, and barricade appears exactly once in the whole regulation — here. Subsections (2) and (3), in the same image, are the only flexibility the section grants, and they run the other way: they let the minister excuse a barricade altogether, before work starts, on a road with no bridges or major culverts. Nothing anywhere in the section asks for a heavier one.

The header of the prescription for this road, on its own line beside the location and the date. NO ACCESS is not a qualified level. The same field on the original of 7 October 2020 reads ATV; that is the field the May 2021 revision changed, and §04 sets out the reversal.

The last waypoint on the summary table, in the column headed Comments. The barricade at the bottom of the work is not a structure set across the road surface — it is the ninety metres of full pullback that begins at 4+750 and ends here. A re-contoured slope does not sort a pickup from a quad, and the header on page 1 says it is not meant to.
The yellow band is the Ministry’s own. In the workbook it fills row 99, where the pullback starts, and it stops there: row 100 — the row quoted here — the Ministry left unmarked. Nothing on this image is ours.
Section 82 (1) (a) sets the standard, and the prescription written for this road does not meet it. The section states what a deactivation barricade has to stop — motor vehicles, “other than all-terrain vehicles” — and it binds whoever deactivates the road. The Ministry of Forests wrote this prescription. It is headed “Access Level Remaining after Deact: NO ACCESS”, and its last waypoint makes the barricade a ninety-metre re-contour. Ninety metres of pulled-back slope stops a quad exactly as it stops a truck.FPPR s. 82 (1) (a); Rady FSR Permanent Deactivation Summary Table, page 1 header and row 100 — the three images above
Those four words have to do work. Barricade appears exactly once in the whole regulation, and it arrives carrying a carve-out for all-terrain vehicles — and a carve-out that permits nothing is not a carve-out. What the section asks for is a barricade of the road surface width: something set across a road that is still there to be crossed. That is a barricade a quad gets past, on a road that survives the work — and nothing in the section lowers it.FPPR s. 82 (1) (a), in the image above
The only flexibility in the section runs our way. Subsections (2) and (3) let a person ask the minister to be excused from the barricade requirement — before deactivation begins, and only on a road with no bridges or major culverts — and let the minister grant it where motor-vehicle use will not damage the works. That is authority to build less than section 82 asks for. There is no provision anywhere authorising more.FPPR s. 82 (2) and (3), in the image above
British Columbia does have lawful ways to keep every vehicle off a forest service road. Here is each of them — and every one is a decision somebody signs.
A district manager’s closure. A forest service road may be used by anyone for non-industrial purposes, and the district manager may close it or restrict its use where use would damage the road, deliver sediment, or endanger people or property — including by posting a traffic control device against named classes of vehicle. No such closure, and no such device, has been produced for this road.FRPA s. 22.2 (1) to (3); Forest Service Road Use Regulation, B.C. Reg. 70/2004, ss. 6 and 9
A ministerial order over recreational use. The minister may by order prohibit a recreational use anywhere on Crown land, and must post a notice of that order in the area it covers. No order, and no posted notice, either.FRPA s. 58 (1) (b) and (3)
That is the complete list, and not one of them has been used — nothing released to the club or to us records an exemption, a closure, a traffic control device, an order or a notice for this road. The claim here is against a document, not a person: the works as prescribed do not meet the standard the regulation sets, and no instrument authorising the difference has been produced. If one exists, publish it — it ends this argument in a single page, and we will print it here in full.
The tender re-issued on 9 September 2026 carries a new prescription — a forty-two page report by SNT Geotechnical Ltd. dated 8 September 2026, commissioned by the Ministry and written after a site walk three weeks earlier. It is not the 2020 summary table quoted above. Two passages in it speak directly to access.

The prescription is a consultant’s report, and this is the instruction it was written to — set in the report’s own bold, at the close of the section setting out the regulation, immediately before the deactivation plan begins. The requirement that no vehicle access remain came from the Ministry, before the engineering was done. It is not a conclusion the report reaches. It is a term of reference the report is handed.Rady FSR Road Deactivation, SNT Geotechnical Ltd., 8 September 2026, page 5. The bold is the document’s own, not ours.

The paragraph prescribing the recontouring at the switchback, shown whole above. It goes on: “It may be possible to cut a narrow ATV trail across the recontoured road surface at the time of deactivation works, however, the excess material generated from constructing the trail will need to be transported to a suitable waste site. This will result in an increased cost for the works above that of the prescribed recontouring.”
What that establishes, exactly. A qualified professional retained by the Ministry states in writing that these works end vehicle access including ATV access; that a narrow ATV trail across the recontoured surface may be possible; and that cutting one would cost more than the recontouring alone. That is the whole of it. The report does not say the trail was assessed, costed or refused, and it does not say a narrow trail would be adequate. An ATV trail is mentioned in this one paragraph and nowhere else in the forty-two pages.
Read with the instruction above, the sequence on the record is this: the Ministry stated that post-deactivation vehicular access was not required; the prescription was written to that; and the single place an alternative surfaces in the document, it surfaces as an added cost.
This does not answer the question this section asks. No mechanism exists to hand this corridor to anyone to manage, and a prescription cannot create one. What it settles is narrower, and it is now in the Ministry’s own current document rather than in our reading of one: the works as prescribed end ATV access, and a trail across them is described as an added cost, not an impossibility.Rady FSR Road Deactivation, SNT Geotechnical Ltd., 8 September 2026, page 10, section 6, segment ∆16 to ∆18. The only other uses of trail in the report are in its general appendix, describing skid trails and backspar trails.
In April 2026 the Trout Lake Recreational Club applied under Section 57 of the Forest and Range Practices Act to maintain the corridor itself, at its own expense. The file took four months, then moved in a single morning. The correspondence around it is published here in full.

The province’s own intake record classifies the application as “Maintain an existing trail/facility, including long-term maintenance.” The club proposed to start on 6 June 2026 and finish by the end of that month, at its own cost.
Note the routing: the package went to the district recreation office for review and decision — addressed to two officers.

The email does not say who gave that direction. The application had been sitting since 20 April. It was expedited to a decision the morning after CTV News reported the story nationally, and the club was told to redirect its questions to the Regional Director the same afternoon.
The second paragraph is the part that matters most. Recalling a conversation from a decade ago, he writes that “authorization was not needed to utilize these roads for public use and no authorization was granted” — and that “I did approve the installation of trail names and directional signage for public safety reasons.”
That is the recreation officer confirming, in writing, that his office put the province’s signage on these routes and treated them as public. No referral to that office, and no reply from it, appears anywhere in what has been released to us — though a stakeholder submission shown in the documentary quotes the Ministry as saying referrals were sent to the agency and that no comments came back. We hold the film, not that letter; the text and its limits are in the questions.

The recreation officer then points the club at the only door he believes is open: “from what I understand the MOF has opened the door for the possibility of a License of Occupation.” He is relaying, second-hand, what another ministry might accept. He adds that there “may be capacity constraints on your end” and encourages the club to build capacity with the mining and business interests and apply.
Read the exclusion again. It ends “…or resource roads where an overlapping established recreation trail exists.” The Silvercup Ridge Trail is a registered recreation trail — REC2372, listed by Recreation Sites & Trails BC as open, maintained to its standards by partners or contractors, with motorized trail-bike riding among its permitted activities. ↗ Whether it overlaps this road is precisely the question the exception turns on. He quoted the whole clause. The only highlight in his letter is the yellow one above, on “including Forest Service Roads”, and it stops before the exception in the same sentence. The decision does not say whether the exception was considered, or how “overlapping” was assessed. A request for the assessment records is published here.
The application in front of the agency answered that question on its face. Asked whether the project sat in an established recreation site or trail, the club answered Yes, and named it: “Silver Cup Ridge Trail Rec # 2372 for 0.4 km/s.” Three pages later it stated that the deactivation prescription runs over “…0.4 kms of the actual Silver Cup Ridge Registered Trail # 2372.” That is the club’s assertion on its own form, not a finding by the province — and it is the assertion the province has never tested. If it is right, the excavators are not working up to a registered recreation trail. They are working on four hundred metres of one, and the exception the decision does not address is the exception that applies.
Nothing in the public REC2372 listing settles it either way: the listing names American Creek Road, Copper Queen Road and the Dirt Road as access routes and does not name Rady Creek. The overlap is a question of fact about where the prescription runs, and the only party with the survey to answer it is the ministry that wrote the prescription. ↗
And note what disqualifies the road in the decision: mining, business and highway vehicle interest. The busier and more economically useful the corridor, the less eligible it becomes for the designation that would protect it.
The yellow highlight on the letter above is in the document as it was released. We have added no emphasis of our own to this exhibit, and nothing on the page has been moved or left out between the reference line and the paragraph that ends it.
The application sat for four months. Then, in less than a day, it was expedited, refused, and questions were referred upward. Here is the clock, with every entry taken from a dated document.
This is not a demand without a plan. On 6 July 2026 the BC Snowmobile Federation put a four-point proposal to the Minister of Forests. It has been on his desk ever since.
Halt physical work at Rady Creek long enough for a formal cross-ministry transition review — Forests, Environment and Parks, Recreation Sites and Trails BC, local representatives and recreation partners at the same table.
Use a temporary wilderness road designation to hold the corridor legally stable while a permanent transfer framework is built. This is the mechanism MLA Scott McInnis has asked the Legislature to apply.
This corridor has no bridges and no large culverts — the lowest-risk footprint in the province on which to design a standardised transition tool. Build the pathway here, then apply it everywhere.
The Federation and the Trout Lake club have offered to fund an independent geotechnical assessment themselves, removing the cost and the administrative burden from the Ministry entirely.
This is not a hypothetical proposal. In April 2026 the Trout Lake Recreational Club applied under Section 57 to maintain this road itself, in volunteer hours rather than public money, and was refused four months later.
The Province would not fund the maintenance. The people who use the road offered to do it themselves, unpaid, and were turned down.
So cost cannot be the reason the road has to go. The obstacle is not money — it is which agency is allowed to say this road matters.
The Section 57 application was the second time this corridor could have changed hands. The first offer came six years earlier, unprompted, from the company that holds the road permit — and the one agency that could have designated these routes was copied on it.
Writing to the Quad Riders ATV Association of BC on 2 March 2020, Cooper Creek Cedar’s harvesting supervisor put two things on the table. The company “will attempt to maintain at minimum ATV access” — and it was “willing to transfer any road sections under our Road Permit to stakeholder groups that would like to assume liability.” On the Cc line was Tennessee Trent, Regional Director of Recreation Sites and Trails BC.Reply to ATVBC, 2 March 2020, Cc John Hawkings and Tennessee Trent ↗
We are not going to tell you that taking that offer would have been simple. Assuming the liability attached to a road permit is not a small thing, and nobody has ever set out what it would have required of a volunteer club. What the record shows is narrower, and harder to argue with: the offer was made in writing, the agency that could have acted on it was on the thread, and no reply from that agency appears in anything released to us.
And the concern reached that agency in writing. The message of 2 March 2020 copied to Tennessee.Trent@gov.bc.ca, Regional Director of Recreation Sites and Trails BC, carries the subject line “Re: Cooper Creek Cedar Trout Lake Road Deactivation Referral”, names the ATV association’s objection in its opening lines — “I assume this is your groups main concern” — and quotes ATVBC’s letter of response directly beneath it. We publish it whole in section 03. That is the licensee’s own referral thread, not a Ministry referral to the agency — but it is a document showing a concern about this road put in front of the agency that could have designated it. With the information we have, it seems likely the objection was in front of that agency and went unanswered.
That agency was not being asked to take a chance on strangers. Three years earlier, in March 2017, the Trout Lake Recreational Club had handed Recreation Sites and Trails BC the list of every route it rode and maintained — set out in section 02. And a designation by that same agency was the only route this road ever had to capital status, which the Auditor General describes as unlikely to be deactivated and as requiring continual maintenance.Auditor General of BC, Management of Forest Service Roads, November 2020 ↗
Two ways to keep this road were offered by the people closest to it. The licensee offered to hand it over. The club offered to look after it. Neither offer needed a new law written, and both of them needed one agency to answer.
What is scheduled instead is the Province’s own scope of work, as put back out to tender on 9 September 2026: 160 excavator hours — sixteen ten-hour days — 180 labourer hours, eighteen days of all-terrain vehicle and eighteen days of pickup truck, with a certified faller and eighteen days of private accommodation on top, to take out a corridor the club had offered to hold with the inspections, hand-dug drains and brushing set out above.Quantities from the Province’s own tender offer form, contract EN27DSE008, as re-issued 9 September 2026 — read in section 02, with what it is likely to cost. The June 2026 form it replaced scoped 200 excavator hours, 200 labourer hours and twenty days of each vehicle.
That effort is not saved by removing the road. It is spent removing it.
Recreation Sites and Trails BC refused the club because Rady Creek is a Forest Service Road, and pointed it, second-hand, at a licence of occupation in another ministry. The ministry that does own Forest Service Roads publishes a numbered agreement for a non-industrial user to maintain one — and it puts the liability and the insurance on that user, not on the Crown.
There is already a form for this. The Ministry publishes the FS 1205 — Forest Service Road Maintenance Agreement, subtitled “For a Non-Industrial User To Carry out Maintenance Works”. It lets someone other than a logging company maintain a forest service road, puts the liability and a $2,000,000 insurance policy on them rather than the Province, and is signed by the District Manager — the same office that holds the deactivation decision for this road.
It is not a rescue on its own. It covers surface maintenance, not structures; it does not stop a deactivation; and nothing obliges a district to offer one. Using it here would take the Ministry deciding to, which is the reform this section is asking for. Nothing released to us shows it was ever put on the table.Ministry of Forests, Forest Roads permits, authorizations and access agreements · the form itself, stamped FS1205 2024/03/27 ↗ ↗
The recreation officer could not help, and said so — Forest Service Roads sit outside his agency’s authority. He pointed the club at a licence of occupation he had heard about, in a different ministry. The ministry that owns the road publishes an agreement for a non-industrial user to maintain it, indemnify the Crown, and insure it for two million dollars — and the district manager signs it.
It would not have saved this road on its own, and we are not going to say it would. But it is a door in the right ministry, it has a form number, and nothing released to us shows anyone opened it.
The road sits with the Ministry of Forests. The designation sits with Environment and Parks. Neither can complete a transfer alone, and nothing compels them to sit down together.
Even a road that clears the designation enters a funding pool that met 14% of district requests. A pathway with no budget behind it moves roads from one queue into another.
The Ministry publishes an agreement that puts the liability on a non-industrial user and makes it insure the work — the FS 1205, signed by the district. But nothing compels a district to offer one, nothing in it stops a deactivation, and nothing released to us shows one was ever put on the table here.
Rady Creek is not an outlier. It is the front of a queue — and every road behind it will be resolved the same way, for the same reason, unless the pathway gets built.
In the Selkirk district alone, four more roads are already posted or under way. One of them, Heights FSR, carries an explicit note in the Ministry's own listing: there will be no ATV access after completion.
Around Trout Lake it has already happened. The Trout Lake Recreational Club counts seven access routes lost in the valley before this one — Asher, Fish River, Branch 2, Healy, Gainer Creek, Lardeau Creek and Cup Creek. Four of those were closed not by a prescription but by pulling a bridge: one crew, one day, permanent, and invisible in the deactivation listings.
Rady Creek is what is left. It is also the only one of the eight with no bridge to pull — which is why removing it takes ninety-one prescribed waypoints, an excavator contract and five years of shifting reasons.
Province-wide the arithmetic is worse. Roughly 58,000 kilometres of Forest Service Road exist; around 12,000 carry the capital status that makes them unlikely to be deactivated. The rest sit at the wilderness minimum, and the wilderness minimum does not guarantee that a vehicle can get through.
This is how an adventure tourism economy gets hollowed out. Not by a single decision anyone would defend in public, but by a hundred district-level decisions taken quietly, each one individually reasonable under a policy that offers no alternative. The operators, guides, lodges, fuel stops and repair shops that depend on backcountry access do not lose it in one announcement. They lose one road a year until the trip is no longer worth taking.
Trout Lake village has just over fifty full-time residents and three remaining industries — tourism, mineral exploration and recreation. All three run up this road. Communities like it do not recover access once the bench is gone; they simply stop being places people drive to.
Pause Rady Creek. Build the transition pathway here, on the lowest-risk road in the province, and attach real money to it. Then apply it to the four roads already queued behind this one — and to the thousands of kilometres that will reach the same decision point over the next decade.
Deactivation is not decided in Victoria. Under the Forest and Range Practices Act it belongs to one official at the district level — and it can be paused from above. Not everyone on this page is an obstacle. An MLA has carried it into the Legislature, and a regional director now holds the file. The block is structural, not personal.
Legislative Assembly of BC
Legislative Assembly of BC
Google Images
Google Images
Legislative Assembly of BCThe commitments published in section 05 were made by Garth Wiggill, then Regional Executive Director for the Kootenay Boundary, and Tara DeCourcy, then District Manager of the Selkirk Natural Resource District. Both have since moved on; the decision they set in motion has not.
Wildfire & Climate ConferenceNone of these organisations is connected to this site. They are independent bodies, and between them they speak for snowmobilers, quad riders, four-wheel drivers, prospectors, dealers and the community itself. Several have been pushing the Province since 2021 — not for a favour on one road, but to change how these decisions get made at all. Section 11 lists the people who can stop this. These are the people who have been trying to.
Trout Lake
Snowmobilers
Four-wheel drivers
Public land users
Trout Lake Recreational Club
BC Snowmobile Federation
Four Wheel Drive Association of BC
Public Land Use Society
Quad Riders ATV Association of BC
Association for Mineral Exploration BC
BC Powersports Dealers Association
The district page still lists it under upcoming works. A pause is an administrative decision that can be made this week. Here is how to force the question.
Ask for an immediate pause and release of the safety evidence. Pre-written, addressed to the Minister and copied to Environment, the MLA and the district office.
Open the emailThe Trout Lake Recreational Club and Arrow Lakes Ridge Riders are demanding a pause and a legal review of how this decision was made. Add your name.
Sign at Change.org 7,639 verified signatures as at 26 August 2026 ↗Photographs, dates you used the road, correspondence with the Ministry. If you work inside government and something here is wrong, we want to hear from you.
Submit a tipWas a public comment period held for Rady Creek FSR 0321.02, and where was it published? Ask in writing, so there is a record, and send us whatever comes back.
Email the district officeFifteen records would settle this argument and the Ministry holds every one of them. Each request is written out ready to paste into the government’s form, narrow enough that it cannot be waved away as too broad. It costs $10 and takes about ten minutes. You do not need our permission and you do not need to tell us — but if you send us what comes back, we will publish it in full, whichever way it cuts.
Each request is also set out individually in section 14. The download holds the first thirteen; requests 14 and 15 are written out in full on that page.The Board is independent of the Ministry, and under section 121 of the Forest and Range Practices Act the government is a party it can investigate. Any person may complain. There is no fee and no standing test. It cannot stop the work — but it can compel records, publish its findings, recommend the decision be cancelled or varied, and oblige the Ministry to answer in writing. In 2002, on a road in this same district, that was enough to change the plan.
fpbcomplaints@bcfpb.ca · 1-800-994-5899Every claim on this page rests on a document. Both are listed here — what we hold, and what has changed on the page since it was first published.
Every document behind this page, linked. Seven are public government releases; the rest are primary records held in our archive and shared read-only. If a link does not open for you, ask and we will send the file — contact@saverady.com.
Government records obtained under freedom-of-information requests.
Documents and emails from the people who received them.
Material already public online.
We never alter what a document says. Only presentation is refined, and only for legibility.
What was added to this page, and when.
What we still need
Fifteen records would end this argument. Requests 14 and 15 were added on 30 August 2026. The Ministry of Forests holds every one of them, and Freedom of Information is the only way they come out. We will publish whatever comes back, whichever way it cuts.
The name and registration number of the professional engineer — or professional geoscientist — who reviewed, prescribed or sealed any part of the deactivation for FSR 0321.02; the sealed document itself; and the executed copy of the prescription, carrying a signature on the “Prescriber” line and a date on the “Date Signed” line.
Settles the central claim. The Regional Executive Director told the BC Snowmobile Federation the deactivation “was prescribed by a professional engineer.” The prescription names a Registered Forest Technologist — and the district’s own briefing note two weeks later says the recommendations came from a “professional geoscientist” instead. Those are separate registrations in law. Every copy released to the club is unsigned and undated. Both alternatives are asked for here, so the answer cannot turn on which word was used.
Get this request ↗Every terrain stability, geotechnical and hydrology assessment held for FSR 0321.02, with the date each was commissioned.
The District Manager was asked twice for the engineer’s report on 9 November 2021 and could not say whether one existed. If none exists, the hazard finding has no technical basis.
Get this request ↗The instruction to expedite the Section 57 decision — who issued it, to whom, when, and in what form. Project ID 976595, between 18 and 19 August 2026.
The covering email records a direction to expedite. The direction itself has never been released.
Get this request ↗The referral letter the Ministry cited in 2021; the road permit deactivation records for the licensee sections below the FSR; and the letter of response the Quad Riders ATV Association of BC sent on 27 February 2020 on “Road Permit R07745 Deactivation – Stakeholder Referral”, with every copy of it held by the Ministry.
The stated trigger for removal was a licensee giving up the permit below the road. We hold the company’s own January 2020 referral. We do not hold the Ministry’s 2021 referral letter, or any record that the permit sections were ever deactivated. We also do not hold the ATVBC letter. The covering e-mail of 27 February 2020 says a letter is attached; the attachment is missing from the thread we hold. Two Ministry officials were copied on that thread, so the Ministry may hold it — and it is the only document that records what the riders themselves said, rather than the company’s account of it.
Get this request ↗The complete consultation package sent to Kootenay Boundary Region – First Nations Relations for project 71M2707, and every response received — including all pages of the Consultation Request Intake Form (CRIF) for file 11250-30-0321.02, project 71M2707, dated 27 April 2021; every page following the one that ends mid-table at “MAPPING & GEOSPATIAL DATA: MAP SHEET #”; and the referral distribution list for project 71M2707, naming every body the referral was sent to — whether or not that list appears on the form itself.
The intake form prints both consultation routes and marks neither, so it does not record which was taken. What the road actually carries — highway vehicles, not just ATVs — does not appear in it either. We hold page one only, and it stops mid-form. Without naming the rest, this request can be answered with the page we already have — and a distribution list kept on the file, but never printed on the form, would fall outside a request worded only around the document.
Get this request ↗Any referral to Recreation Sites & Trails BC on FSR 0321.02 and any reply to it; the file showing whether recreation was weighed before the prescription was written; and the distribution list for every stakeholder notification sent for project 71M2707, including the separate notification to mine claims and water users.
Nothing released to us shows that agency was ever asked, and it is on neither notification — five recipients on 28 April 2021, six on 11 May. “No records exist” would itself be the answer. The 28 April message ends “Mine claims and water users will be addressed in a separate e-mail”, so the district built its lists by interest class; the lists show who it decided recreation was. RSTBC later classified the same site as “maintain an existing trail/facility.” That position has never been reconciled with the removal.
Get this request ↗Every maintenance recommendation made for FSR 0321.02 since it became a forest service road — date, author, estimated cost, who approved or refused it, and whether the work was done.
This is the record that shows whether the road was allowed to fail. The Auditor General found districts asked for $40.2M in 2019/20 and received $5.5M.
Get this request ↗Every record of contact between the Association for Mineral Exploration British Columbia and the Ministry of Forests touching FSR 0321.02 or access to the Silvercup Ridge claims — meeting notes, briefing materials and follow-up correspondence, 2025–2026.
We are asking because we cannot show it either way. We hold lobbying-registry records for HeliCat Canada and none for the Association for Mineral Exploration, and no meeting between the Association and the Minister is documented in anything we have. The decision that refused the club’s application cited “the mining interest” as a reason — without naming a single tenure holder. This request asks who that is, and what was said.
Get this request ↗The RSTBC trail list and mapping records for the Trout Lake area from 2017, and every closure or deactivation decision affecting a route on that list since.
The club handed over its full trail list and says the routes on it have been closing ever since. This record settles that account either way.
Get this request ↗Road Engineering Risk Analysis and Maintenance Inspection Reports for 0321.02, for every year the road has existed.
Seven of eight districts the Auditor General sampled kept no historical inspection data. Two kept no maintenance records at all.
Get this request ↗Public notice, referral and comment records for FSR 0321.02, 2021–2026.
Everyone who wrote in was promised consultation in writing. Twenty-two kilometres away, on Kuskanax, the Ministry ran that process in full.
Get this request ↗Deactivation and bridge removal records for Asher, Fish River, Branch 2, Healy, Gainer Creek, Lardeau Creek and Cup Creek — with dates and authorising decisions.
Bridge removals do not appear in the district deactivation listings at all. Without these records the scale of what has already been removed cannot be counted.
Get this request ↗Deactivation prescriptions and their engineering basis for Incomappleux 3397, Kuskanax Creek 0042.05, Heights FSR 0237.04 and Sitkum Creek 0235.01.
Heights is already recorded as no ATV access after completion. If these were written the same way, this is a process, not one road.
Get this request ↗The e-mail promised in the closing line of the stakeholder notification of 28 April 2021 — “Mine claims and water users will be addressed in a separate e-mail” — with its distribution list and any reply. File 11250-30-0321.02, project 71M2707, Selkirk Resource District.
The Ministry’s own notification says a second one was going out. Nothing released to us contains it. If it exists, it names the mineral-claim holders and the water interests the district itself named — the interest the 2026 refusal invoked without naming anyone. If it does not exist, an audience the Ministry itself singled out was never notified. “No records exist” is a complete answer to this one, and it is the answer that matters.
Ask us for this one ↗The unsevered text withheld under FIPPA s. 16 at page 1361 of the 1410-page Selkirk Resource District release, in the chain headed “Sample Deactivation Referral Fact Sheet to start deactivation process”, July 2022 — and which paragraph of s. 16(1) was relied on — (a), (b) or (c) — with the written reasons for the severing.
The prescriber wrote that she had given “three alternatives to address the current instabilities and risk in not carrying out the deactivation” and that “these choices are my managers to make, not mine.” The passage immediately after that is severed, and the notation on the page is a bare s.16 with no paragraph named. If alternatives short of full removal were set out and rejected, that is the record the public has been told does not exist.
Ask us for this one ↗One chronology, thirty-five entries, from the 1895 mine to 24 August 2026. Thirty of them link to the document behind them. The other five rest on testimony, on published reporting or on a public registry, and each says which in its own attribution line. The full document register and the outstanding records requests are in section 14.
Excavators cut drainage trenches across the road, pull the fill back off the outside edge, and at certain points re-contour the slope to its natural angle. The 2025 prescription map for Rady lists 79 waypoints across 4,376 metres; the prescription released to the club lists 91 over 0.0–4.395 km. On the map, seventy-five are ditches and pull-backs, which a grader could undo. Four prescribe full re-contour, which nothing undoes.
It also ends the Ministry's obligation to maintain the road and returns the ground to vacant Crown land.
The Ministry says so and will not show its work. No terrain stability assessment, geotechnical report or hydrology report has been published, and the petitioners say none has been disclosed to them.
What is published is the Ministry’s own prescription map, prepared by a Registered Forest Technologist. A government that believed it had a landslide on its hands would release the report. This one has had five years.
The Central Selkirk herd is genuinely at risk and that deserves to be taken seriously. But caribou is one of five reasons the Ministry has given for Rady, alongside the licensee, safety, funding and the end of logging — and which one you hear depends on who you ask.
The clubs signed a caribou stewardship agreement in February 2021, the Ministry countersigned in March, and they learned from a third party that the road was going. Meanwhile the commercial heli-ski operation flying the same terrain has faced no equivalent restriction — only a request for its flight data, which its industry association resisted.
No. The Auditor General of British Columbia found in November 2020 that “there is no trigger or timeline for deactivation and FSRs can remain open indefinitely if they are maintained as wilderness roads” (p. 11) — the minimum standard applied to every such road in the province.
The Ministry must maintain a road until it deactivates it. Deactivation is the escape hatch that opens when the maintenance money is gone.
Because it is the whole game. The funding policy ranks maintenance money in three tiers, and the third is high-value recreation sites as designated by the Recreation Sites and Trails BC representative. Roads that clear a tier become capital roads, which the Auditor General describes as unlikely to be deactivated and requiring continual maintenance.
Nobody lives on Rady Creek, so tiers one and two were closed. The recreation tier was the only door — and no referral to RSTBC on this road, and no reply from it, has been released to us.
That is not the same as saying it was never asked. A stakeholder submission shown in the documentary at 7:50 quotes a Ministry letter as stating: “referrals were sent to other Ministries including Recreation Sites and Trails (RST) and the Ministry of Mining and Critical Minerals (MCM) to ensure there were no concerns with the planned work. There were no comments received from RST or MCM indicating any concerns with the planned deactivation of this FSR.” We hold the documentary, not that letter. The page on screen is a third-party submission quoting the Ministry, with the author’s own rebuttal running above and below it — not the Ministry’s own record — so we put it no higher than a quotation, and we have asked for the letter itself. Read as written it says no comments came back, which is the absence of a response and not a clearance.
Separately, we do hold one document showing a concern about this road reaching that agency. On 2 March 2020 its Regional Director, Tennessee.Trent@gov.bc.ca, was copied on a message headed “Re: Cooper Creek Cedar Trout Lake Road Deactivation Referral” which names the ATV association’s objection — “I assume this is your groups main concern” — and quotes that association’s letter of response beneath it. It is published whole in section 03. That was the licensee’s own referral thread, not a Ministry referral. With the information we have, it seems likely the objection was in front of the agency and went unanswered.
We have found no record of one — nothing on the district page, nothing in the coalition's material, nothing in any source we have reviewed. The records that would settle it are covered by one of the fifteen requests published here, written and ready to file. Whatever comes back will be published, whichever way it cuts.
What is not in doubt is the comparison. The same district, in the same years, ran a documented public process for the Incomappleux road thirty kilometres away.
Silvercup Ridge drops to two access routes, both at the far ends. Anyone in difficulty up there reaches one of those ends or waits for a helicopter. Mineral tenure and Crown Grant holders lose vehicle access to claims they have spent decades proving up. The winter route into Foggy Day is gone. Trout Lake loses the road all three of its remaining industries depend on.
The Trout Lake club applied under Section 57 to maintain the corridor at its own expense — inspection and drainage checks each spring and fall, hand-digging and clearing cross drains, brushing, debris removal and signage. That was declined because Rady is a Forest Service Road. On the deactivation itself the Ministry's position is that the road must be destroyed first, after which the club is welcome to apply for a permit and rebuild it.
Please do. The Auditor General's report is at bcauditor.com. The prescription map and district road page are on gov.bc.ca. The lobbyist registry is at lobbyistsregistrar.bc.ca — free and searchable. The two meetings we name carry activity numbers; the totals in the lobbying section are counts we took from the registry on 24 August 2026, not single filings, so re-run them.
If you find an error, tell us. We will correct it and log the correction in the open.
SaveRady.com is published by the Backcountry Coalition — a private research group working on public land use issues that affect any recreational user group, mostly within British Columbia, at this time.
The Coalition was founded in British Columbia and has worked alongside established groups including the BC Snowmobile Federation, ATVBC, the Four Wheel Drive Association of BC and the Trout Lake Recreational Club. It is not a substitute or member of any of them, and does not speak for them. It exists to do the work volunteer, membership-first boards rarely have capacity for: pulling public records, filing requests, and publishing what the documents show.
We use publicly available information to do research on issues of public interest and in turn hold public servants accountable for maintaining access to public land.
Rady Creek is our first file. But we promise, it will not be our last.
We will be dropping dispatches, regularly. Stay tuned.